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I. INTRODUCTION 
 America’s obsession with controlling nature for the benefit of 
industrialization has made us a dam nation. “The untransacted destiny of 
the American people . . . to subdue the continent” was accomplished 
largely by building dams.
2
 Dams encouraged settlement by generating 
electric power, improving navigation, providing flood control, and 
delivering water for agricultural, municipal, and industrial development. 
As a result, “[w]e have been building, on average, one large dam . . . 
every single day, since the Declaration of Independence.”
3
 Seventy-six 
                                                 
2. William Gilpin, Mission of the North American People: Geographical, Social, and Political 
130 (J.B. Lippincott and Co. 1874) (quoting a report to the U.S. Senate of 1846), reprinted in Chris 
J. Magoc, So Glorious a Landscape: Nature and the Environment in American History and Culture 
(Scholarly Resources 2002). 
3. Bruce Babbitt, Sec’y of the Interior, Address at the Ecological Soc’y of Am. (Aug. 4, 1998), 
available at http://www.sci.sdsu.edu/salton/DamsAreNotForever.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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thousand large dams,
4
 including 8,100 major dams,
5
 entomb 600,000 
river miles of water.
6
 Counting dams of all sizes, there are well over 2.5 
million in American waters.
7
 As one author has observed, “[v]irtually no 
major river in the United States is without a dam.”
8
 
 Yet this progress has come at a price. A dammed river will never 
function the same as a free-flowing river. The essence of a river is water 
movement. Damming America’s waters has caused a dramatic decline in 
the health of our watersheds. Dams are physical barriers that block the 
natural flow of nutrients and the migration of fish.
9
 “Leaves are no longer 
carried to awaiting insects, and the insects are no longer carried by the 
waters to foraging fish.”
10
 Normally, pebbles, sand, and fallen trees move 
downstream to eventually settle and form diverse habitat.
11
 “Fallen trees 
provide areas of shade and slack water[, while s]ubmerged gravel beds 
make a home for [invertebrates and] act as spawning grounds for 
migratory fish . . . .”
12
 But when a dam is built, the flow of sediment is 
trapped behind the impoundment, causing the downstream river bottom 
to wash away and leave a coarse riverbed in which some invertebrates, 
an essential food source for fish, cannot survive.
13
 The lack of sediment 




 In addition to acting as physical barriers, dams change water levels 
and the timing of flows.
15
 River flow volumes are meant to vary widely 
from season to season, and this variability “is an indispensible part of 
how a river system works.”
16
 For example, the lifecycles of many river 
                                                 
4. THE HEINZ CTR., DAM REMOVAL: SCIENCE AND DECISION MAKING 23 (2002). This 1996 
figure comes from the National Inventory of Dams, which catalogs all dams greater than six feet 
high with more than fifty acre-feet of storage, and those that are twenty-five feet high with more than 
fifteen acre-feet of storage. 
5. The National Inventory of Dams defines a major river as being fifty feet tall with a storage 
capacity of at least 5,000 acre feet, or of any height with a storage capacity of 25,000 acre feet. Nat’l 
Inventory of Dams, Major Dams of the United States, NAT’L ATLAS OF THE U.S., 
http://www.nationalatlas.gov/mld/dams00x.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
6. Babbitt, supra note 3. 
7. HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 23. 
8. Elizabeth Grossman, Watershed: the Undamming of America 3 (Counterpoint 2002). 
9. Peter J. Carney, Dam Removal: Evolving Federal Policy Opens a New Venue of Fisheries 
and Ecosystem Management, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 309, 327 (2000). 
10. Id. at 328. 
11. Hydropower Reform Coal., Dam Effects, DAMEFFECTS.ORG, http://www.dameffects.org 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. GROSSMAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
15. Id. 
16. Hydropower Reform Coal., supra note 11. 
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species follow the timing of high and low flows, with seasonal events 
like high springtime flows triggering a new phase in their lives.
17
  
 Last, but certainly not least, dams make for poor water quality. Two 
common water quality problems associated with dams are temperature 
and dissolved oxygen.
18
 The water from deep behind an impoundment 
can be significantly cooler than the downstream river’s shallow and sun-
soaked waters.
19
 “In the summer, temperatures can be unnaturally cold 
on the bottom of [the impoundment] and too warm on the surface.”
20
 
While “[i]n winter, deep waters can be unnaturally warm.”
21
  
 Dissolved oxygen, essential for aquatic life, is also altered. “[W]hen 
organic materials that have built up behind the dam begin to decompose, 
they consume the limited [amounts of dissolved] oxygen [available].”
22
 
The lowest levels of the reservoir become devoid of oxygen, creating 
dead zones that cannot support river life. Depending upon how a dam is 
constructed, water may be released from either the top or bottom of the 
impoundment. Water released from the top of the impoundment may 
cause excessive uptake of air from the atmosphere and result in water 
that contains too much atmospheric gas.
23
 Conversely, water released 
from the bottom of a deep reservoir is oxygen-deprived.
24
 These effects 
on water temperature, oxygen level, rate of flow, composition of 
spawning beds, and food supply have so negatively impacted the ability 
of anadromous fish to survive that the salmon has become a cause 
célèbre in the Pacific Northwest.
25
  
 But reasons for dam removal go beyond environmental concerns. 
By 2020, over 60,000 dams (eighty percent) listed in the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers’ (Army Corps of Engineers) National Inventory of 
Dams will be more than fifty years old and nearing the end of their 
design life.
26
 Structural obsolescence poses significant safety risks to 
human life,
27
 and the cost of performing necessary structural repairs 
                                                 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Carney, supra note 9, at 327. 
20. Hydropower Reform Coal., supra note 11. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Mo. Dep't of Natural Res., Water Chemistry, Introductory Level Workshop 4, 
http://www.dnr.mo.gov/env/wpp/vmqmp/vwqm-intro07.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
24. Id. 
25. See generally THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 47 (“[The Pacific Northwest] is famous for 
severely depleted salmon runs and large hydroelectric projects that may be contributing to the 
declines.”). 
26. Id. at 41. 
27. See generally id. at 42 (“Dam safety and security is a major issue in the consideration of 
dam removal.”). According to the National Inventory of Dams, roughly thirty-two percent of dams 
(26,652 dams) pose a high or significant hazard potential. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, Dams by 
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often exceeds the price of removal.
28
 Many dams have also become 
economically obsolete, outliving the mills or regional power grids they 
once served.
29
 Early hydropower facilities that generated electrical power 
for regional power grids are now serviced by larger, more efficient 
sources on the national grid.
30
 Hydropower facilities once provided an 
all-time high of one-third of the nation’s electrical energy during the 
1940s,
31
 but by 1996 hydropower accounted for only one-tenth of the 
nation’s total generating capacity.
32
 Recognizing that the public interest 
now favors a healthy, free-flowing river over electric power generation, 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has taken the 
unprecedented step of ordering the removal of obsolete dams.
33
 
 This article explores ways to remove dams whose existence no 
longer benefits the public because of environmental, safety, or economic 
concerns. Three legal tools could accomplish this: (1) the Endangered 
Species Act, (2) federal and state dam safety proceedings, and (3) the 
FERC’s hydropower relicensing procedure. Each of these avenues will 
be explored, followed by a discussion of Fifth Amendment taking claims 
and other sources of liability that could result from dam removal. 
II. LEGAL TOOLS TO REMOVE DAMS 
A. The Endangered Species Act 
 The Endangered Species Act
34
 (ESA) can be an effective tool for 
the removal of public and private hydropower and nonhydropower dams. 
The ESA is a federal statute implemented to protect endangered and 
threatened fish, wildlife, and plant species, and the ecosystems upon 
which they depend. While the ESA has never been used to force dam 
removal, it has spurred both the federal government and private entities 
to voluntarily remove dams in order to avoid ESA takings claims.
35
  
                                                                                                             
Hazard Potential, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:2016393
958697412::NO (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
28. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 44 (“[Removal of a dam] may be much less expensive 
than . . . performing needed structural repairs.”). 
29. Id. at 43. In the eastern United States, “dams that diverted . . . streams for millraces or 
raised water levels to drive waterwheels lasted longer than the mills they served.” Id. 
30. Id. at 43–44. 
31. The History of Hydropower Development in the United States, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
http://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
32. Carney, supra note 9, at 311. 
33. FERC Project Decommissioning at Relicensing; Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 339, 342–
43 (Jan. 4, 1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.24) [hereinafter FERC Policy Statement]. 
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–43 (2009). 
35. Margaret B. Bowman, Legal Perspectives on Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 739, 741 
(2002). 
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 The ongoing Elwha Ecosystem Restoration Project—the nation’s 
largest dam removal project—is a prime example.
36
 In September 2011 
the process of removing the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams to restore 
the free flow of the Elwha River began.
37
 It is “the largest dam removal 
project in U.S. history[, and] will reopen more than 70 miles of pristine 
[salmon] spawning and rearing habitat in the Elwha River and its 
tributaries.”
38
 The National Park Service predicts that salmon populations 
will “swell from 3,000 to nearly 400,000 as all five species of Pacific 
salmon return” to the iconic Pacific Northwest river.
39
 Although 
congressional legislation was the ultimate force behind the dam’s 
removal,
40
 fear of future ESA liability was no doubt taken into account.
41
  
 The ESA has also been responsible for changing the way dams 
operate by requiring the installation of fish passage devices and 
maintenance of certain flow levels for the protection of threatened 
species.
42
 Use of the ESA’s citizen suit provision to enforce a taking of a 
protected species could result in an injunction to modify a dam’s 
operation or force its removal.
43
 For these reasons, the ESA provides the 
impetus for the voluntary removal of many private dams.
44
 Where 
removal cannot be accomplished voluntarily, two sections of the ESA 
could be used to compel dam removal: (1) the “consultation” or 
prevention of jeopardy provisions in Section 7, and (2) the prohibition of 
taking a listed species in Section 9.
45
 Each of these sections will be 
discussed below. 
                                                 
36. Elwha River Restoration, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/elw




40. Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3173 
(1992). 
41. See Elwha River Restoration: Background and History, AMERICAN RIVERS, 
http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/restoring-rivers/dams/projects/elwha-river-
background.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (“The dam’s owner became increasingly concerned that a 
court order would some day force it to remove the dams and foot the bill for river restoration.”). 
After removal of the dams began, several organizations sued the National Park Service and other 
agencies for violations of the Endangered Species Act associated with the Elwha Fish River 
Restoration Plan. Notice Letter from the Wild Fish Conservancy et al. to the Nat’l Park Serv. et al. 
(Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://wildfishconservancy.org/copy_of_news/in-the-
news/notice.letter2011.09.16.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
42. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation—
Biological Opinion, Cushman Hydroelectric Project, Project No. 460-033, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv. Ref. No. 13410-2010-F-0169, at 53 (Apr. 2010) (on file with author) (recommending the use 
of fish-passage protocols for the conservation of bull trout on the Skokomish River). 
43. Cf. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting an injunction 
against a logging company under citizen suit provision of the ESA). 
44. Bowman, supra note 35, at 741. 
45. Id. 
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1. Section 7 
 Section 7 of the ESA prohibits federal action that destroys or 
otherwise adversely modifies the critical habitat of a listed species or that 
jeopardizes the continued existence of a listed species.
46
 These are two 
distinct standards.
47
 The “destruction/adverse modification standard” has 
been defined “in terms of actions that diminish the value of critical 
habitat for recovery.”
48
 The so-called “jeopardy standard” “addresses the 
effect of the action itself on the survival and recovery of the species.”
49
  
 Because Section 7 is limited to actions taken by the federal 
government, most private dams appear to be beyond the reach of its 
protection. This is particularly troubling because according to the 
National Inventory of Dams the federal government owns only about 
four percent of the more than 80,000 dams inventoried.
50
 Fortunately, 
Section 7 applies to private persons whenever a dam is built. The 
construction of a dam requires the discharge of dredged or fill material 
into waters of the United States, an activity governed by Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act (CWA).
51
 If the dam is built in navigable waters, the 
discharge must be authorized by the federal government, through the 
Army Corps of Engineers, to comply with the CWA.
52
 States may 
assume the 404 permitting program only for discharges into 
nonnavigable waters.
53
 Even where a state has jurisdiction, the EPA 
retains authority to review and reject “larger discharges with serious 
impacts.”
54
 The federal government cannot issue a Section 404 “dredge 
and fill” permit where its issuance would diminish the value of critical 
habitat for recovery of a protected species or otherwise jeopardize the 
species’ recovery. This is the manner in which Section 7 of the ESA is 
applied indirectly to private persons. 
 Besides being limited to actions by the federal government, Section 
7 is further applied only to proposed actions. Although it can be a 
challenge to characterize a dam’s continued operation as a “proposed 
action,” the federal government has sought Section 7 consultation for a 
                                                 
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2009). 
47. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, supra note 27. 
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2010). Section 404 of the CWA established a permit program to regulate 
the discharge of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States.” Id. 
52. Id. 
53. State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact23.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
54. Id. 
8 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:1 
hydropower system’s annual operations plan.
55
 Indeed, there are many 
instances where Section 7’s consultation requirement led to the 




 One further limitation in Section 7’s applicability is that the 
proposed federal action must threaten the “continued existence” of the 
listed species as a whole, meaning more than harm to a few of its 
individuals.
57
 If, after the conclusion of formal consultation, the agency 
determines that the proposed federal action is likely to jeopardize the 
listed species, or destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat, a 
jeopardy finding will be issued in the biological opinion.
58
  
 This “jeopardy” biological opinion must contain “reasonable and 
prudent alternatives” (RPAs) to the proposed federal action that are not 
likely to jeopardize the listed species or destroy or adversely modify its 
critical habitat.
59
 The RPAs, in turn, must be consistent with the original 
purpose of the proposed federal action.
60
 For purposes of dam removal, 
this means that neither the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
nor the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) can recommend dam 
removal as an RPA unless the dam is not central to the purpose of the 
proposed action. 
 In instances like dam removal, where no RPA can be developed, the 
action cannot move forward unless the Endangered Species 
Committee—the so-called “God Squad”
61
—grants an exemption to the 
“no jeopardy” rule.
62
 The committee considers five factors in deciding 
whether to grant an exemption: (1) the availability of reasonable and 
prudent alternatives, (2) the nature and extent of the benefits of the 
                                                 
55. Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
56. See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Final Environmental Impact Statement for 
Relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project No. 2082-027 (Nov. 2007), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2007/11-16-07.asp. 
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2010). 
58. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2009). 
59. Id. 
60. Reasonable and Prudent Alternative, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SW. REG’L OFFICE, 
http://www.swr.noaa.gov/reasonab.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
61. The “God Squad” is a small group of officials who can override the ESA if the cost of 
protecting a species is too great. The group was specifically created by an amendment to the ESA for 
the purpose of allowing the Tellico Dam to be completed. KENNETH M. MUNCHISON, THE SNAIL 
DARTER CASE: TVA VERSUS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 152, 184 (2007). The God Squad 
instead unanimously refused to exempt construction of the Tellico Dam on account of the snail 
darter species. Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Tiny Fish / Big Battle: 30 Years after TVA and the Snail Darter 
Clashed, the Case Still Echoes in Caselaw, Politics and Popular Culture, TENN. B. J. (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.tba.org/Journal_Current/200804/TBJ-200804-coverStory.html. 
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(h) (2010). 
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agency action consistent with conserving the species or its critical 
habitat, (3) whether the action is in the public interest and of regional or 
national significance, (4) whether there are any reasonable mitigation 
measures that should be considered by the committee, and (5) whether 
the agency and exemption applicant refrained from making irreversible 
or irretrievable commitments of resources.
63
  
 Only rarely have the requirements of the ESA significantly delayed 
or cancelled federal projects.
64
 Section 7 has also never singlehandedly 
removed a dam. However, Section 7 has been tremendously successful in 
forcing the modification of dam operations for the benefit of protected 
fish and wildlife, sometimes by requiring certain instream flow levels. 
a) ESA-Mandated Reductions in Water Usage Rights 
 One of the greatest controversies in the history of the ESA involved 
applying Section 7 to the Bureau of Reclamation’s Klamath Project to 
protect endangered fish. In 2001, an extreme drought hit the Klamath 
River Basin, located in southern Oregon and Northern California.
65
 
Hundreds of farmers who had reliably received water for decades from 
the Klamath Project were told they would receive none.
66
 The federal 
government would instead withhold the water and use it to protect an 
endangered species of fish.
67
 Irrigators and their political allies were 
outraged, and the controversy gained national media coverage.
68
 The 
following year, the Bureau of Reclamation breached its Section 7 duties 
and restored full irrigation deliveries.
69
 Thousands of salmon died from 
the resulting low flows and high temperatures of the Klamath River, and 
the Klamath crisis once again led the national news.
70
 Among federal 
courts, the Ninth Circuit has played a critical role in defining the nature 
                                                 
63. Id. § 1536(g)(5). 
64. See Steven L. Yaffee, Avoiding Species/Development Conflicts Through Interagency 
Consultation, Balancing on the Brink of Extinction: The Endangered Species Act and Lessons for 
the Future 86–89 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991). Yaffee acknowledges that a low rate of project 
cancellations could also indicate the success of the ESA if agencies are incorporating endangered 
species protection into project planning. Id. at 90–91. 






69. Id.; see also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 
F.3d 1082, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting Reclamation’s ten-year operating plan for the Klamath 
Project that allowed for delivery of less than the full amount of water necessary to ensure the 
survival of salmon). 
70. Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 27, 2007, 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/leaving_no_tracks/. 
10 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:1 
and extent of the Bureau of Reclamation’s duties under Section 7 of the 
ESA. In a case involving contractual commitments to water users, the 
court rejected the argument that the Bureau breached its contracts by 
reducing water deliveries in dry years.
71
 Stated flatly, the Bureau’s 
responsibilities under the ESA “override the water rights of the 
Irrigators.”
72
 Within the Ninth Circuit, then, Section 7 of the ESA takes 
priority over federal contracts to deliver water to water users, and the 
Bureau of Reclamation must operate its projects in a manner that avoids 
jeopardy.
73
 Yet this was no certain victory for the salmon: a fatal flaw 
lies beneath the surface of this seemingly simple and protective rule. 
b) The Discretionary Rule 
 When pre-ESA legal obligations require a federal agency to operate 
in a way that essentially leaves no room for the consideration of a listed 
species, the so-called “discretionary rule”
74
 exempts the agency from 
complying with the requirements of Section 7: “Section 7 . . . appl[ies] to 
all actions in which there is discretionary federal involvement or 
control.”
75
 No definition of “discretionary” involvement or control is 
provided in the rule. The word “discretionary” is also absent from the 
text of Section 7 of the ESA. With so little guidance as to whether a 
particular federal agency action is discretionary, courts struggle to make 
the determination. 
 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the discretionary 
rule has yielded three general points.
76
 First, discretion is determined “by 
parsing the language of the statutes, rules, and permits most directly 
involved.”
77
 Second, no discretion has been found “in cases where a 
person has an existing permit or approval, and a federal agency either has 
little or no authority to require changes . . . or has latent discretionary 
authority but no legal duty to exercise it.”
78
 Third, all discretionary action 
cases have involved some private activity.
79
 The Ninth Circuit has never 
addressed a case where a federal agency claimed an absence of discretion 
in implementing its own programs or projects.
80
 
                                                 
71. E.g., O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 687 (9th Cir. 1995). 
72. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999). 
73. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, 426 F.3d at 1094 (rejecting a ten-year 
operating plan for the Klamath Project that provided insufficient flows to protect listed salmon). 
74. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009). 
75. Id. 
76. Reed D. Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project 
Operations and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (2008). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the discretionary rule for the 
first time in the landmark case of National Ass’n of Homebuilders v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.
81
 The Court upheld as rational the EPA’s position 
that it had no discretionary authority to consider the impacts on 
endangered species when delegating CWA Section 402 permitting 
authority to Arizona.
82
 The “discretionary rule,” at 50 C.F.R. § 402.23, 
applies Section 7(a)(2) “to all actions in which there is discretionary 
Federal involvement or control.”
83
 The language of Section 402 of the 
CWA reads that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer application that 
satisfies the nine functions specified in the section: “if the nine specified 
criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a 
transfer application.”
84
 Because an agency “cannot simultaneously obey 
the differing mandates of ESA § 7(a)(2) and CWA § 402(b),” the Court 
concluded that the EPA deserved deference for its rule that Section 7 
applies to agency actions where “discretionary federal involvement or 
control” exists.
85
 Consequently, the Court’s holding severely restricts the 
protection of Section 7 by limiting its application to those actions where 
a federal agency exercises discretion. 
 As for dams, whether a federal agency like the Bureau of 
Reclamation has any discretion to consider endangered species in the 
operation of a water project depends upon the legal regime of the specific 
project. In general, three strong arguments can be made in favor of 
considering the Bureau’s operation of a water project as a discretionary 
activity. First, the Bureau of Reclamation “must constantly assess its 
duties, the available facts, and predictions about the future . . . and make 
changes as circumstances dictate.”
86
 Therefore, “if a discretionary action 
is one that involves an exercise of judgment[,]” then the operation of a 
federal water project necessarily demands discretion.
87
 Furthermore, 
“[n]o generally applicable statute strips [the Bureau] of discretion in 
operating its projects.”
88
 Finally, the issuance of a water supply contract 
does not divest the Bureau of operating with discretion.
89
 Whether the 
Bureau of Reclamation has any discretion in operating a project will 
always be determined by the legal obligations of the particular project, 
                                                 
81. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007). 
82. Id. at 665–67. 
83. 50 C.F.R. § 402.23 (2009). 
84. Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders, 551 U.S. at 661. 
85. Id. 
86. Benson, supra note 76, at 23, 41–42. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 43. 
89. Id. at 45–46. 
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but strong arguments can be made against applying the discretionary rule 
in this context. 
2. Section 9 
 The second section of the ESA that could accomplish dam removal 
is Section 9. The section’s taking prohibition makes it unlawful for any 
person—including private and public entities—to take individuals of a 
listed species.
90
 “Take” means “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct.”
91
 “Harm” is defined to include significant habitat modification 
or degradation.
92
 Section 9 also makes it unlawful to cause another party 
to take a listed species.
93
 Courts have applied this to government 
authorization of activities that cause a take.
94
 
 Certain take activities may nonetheless be exempted from Section 
9’s taking prohibition through the incidental take process. An agency 
may issue a permit to take a listed species “if such taking is incidental to, 
and not the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise lawful activity.”
95
 
Antecedent to the issuance of an incidental take permit is the submission 
of a habitat conservation plan (HCP) by the applicant.
96
 Taking the HCP 
and public comments into account, the agency must find that the 
applicant will monitor, minimize, and mitigate the impacts of any 
incidental taking to the maximum extent practicable, and that the taking 
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of 
the species in the wild.
97
 Once an incidental take is granted, the “no 
surprises” rule prohibits the federal government from requiring 
additional funds or resources from the permit holder.
98
 
 Unfortunately, the practical effect of the incidental take process has 
been the loss of many anadromous fish populations. The incidental take 
                                                 
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2010). 
91. Id. § 1532(19). 
92. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 725 (1995) 
(holding the Secretary of the Interior’s definition of “harm” as including “significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.”). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2010). 
94. See, e.g., Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding the State violated the 
ESA’s take prohibition by authorizing fishing that caused a take of the endangered northern right 
whale). 
95. 16 U.S.C. §1539(a)(1)(B) (2010). 
96. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
97. Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
98. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1998) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32) “[N]o additional land use restrictions or financial 
compensation will be required of the permit holder with respect to species covered by the permit, 
even if unforeseen circumstances arise after the permit is issued indicating that additional mitigation 
is needed for a given species covered by a permit.” Id. 
2012] Let the River Run 13 
permit immunizes dam owners from Section 9 liability so long as the 
take does not jeopardize the entire species. The “no surprises” rule 
severely limits the ability of federal agencies to further protect a listed 
species if the HCP proves insufficient. Through the issuance of 
incidental take permits, the government sanctions the deaths of thousands 
of salmon so long as their deaths are merely incidental to a dam’s 
operational goals. Even where no incidental take permit is issued and an 
impermissible taking occurs, the USFWS and the NMFS can only issue 
fines for violating Section 9.
99  
 
Citizens, on the other hand, have more power. A citizen suit can 
result in an injunction to enforce a takings finding where no incidental 
take permit has been issued.
100
 Effective enforcement of the ESA 
therefore requires both the government and the citizenry. 
 In some respects, the ESA falls short of protecting threatened and 
endangered anadromous fish. On the whole, however, the statute has 
saved thousands of fish, and is responsible for many of the milestone 
dam removals in America. The Elwha Ecosystem Restoration Project, for 
example, was motivated by threat of ESA takings claims.
101
 Also in 
Washington State, conditions attached by FERC to the Condit Dam’s 
hydropower license—a process discussed in detail below—in accordance 
with the ESA forced the dam’s owners to either modernize and install 
expensive fish passage devices or remove the dam.
102
 In addition, the 
ESA has changed the way many dams operate by altering instream flow 
levels for the benefit of threatened species. 
B. Dam Safety Proceedings 
 The Association of Dam Safety Officials estimates that 4,400 dams 
are susceptible to failure due to structural deficiencies.
103
 The impact of 
even a single dam failure can be tremendous. In 1889, a neglected dam in 
western Pennsylvania experienced a catastrophic failure, killing over 
                                                 
99. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2009). 
100. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 1996) (The environmental 
group was able to obtain an injunction under the ESA against a logging company in order to 
conserve marbled murrelet nesting habitat on private land). 
101. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE 
ELWHA RIVER ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 1 (June 1995), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=136255. 
(“The Elwha River ecosystem and native anadromous fisheries are severely degraded as a result of 
two hydroelectric dams . . . . The Department of the Interior therefore finds there is a need to return 
this river and ecosystem to its natural, self-regulating state, and proposes removing both dams to 
accomplish this purpose . . . .”). 
102. See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
103. Henry Fountain, Danger is Pent up Behind Aging Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/science/22dam.html?pagewanted=all. 
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2,200 people.
104
 Twenty million tons of water traveled fourteen miles to 
Johnstown, where four square miles of the town were completely 
destroyed by a wall of water forty feet high.
105
 The amount of water that 
would flow over Niagara Falls in thirty-six minutes, 4.8 billion 
gallons,
106
 left a pile of debris that covered thirty acres.
107
 A modern 
twenty-first century version of the Johnstown Flood could be even more 
disastrous. If, for example, the Lake Isabella Dam in California were to 
fail, 180 billion gallons of water—over thirty-seven times the amount 




  Dams can fail for any one of several reasons as they age and reach 
the end of their life spans. For example, the concrete used to construct 
dams deteriorates over time—typically within fifty to one hundred 
years
109
—due to the large volumes of water blocked or diverted on a 
daily basis.
110
 If not properly maintained, these ageing dams pose a 
safety hazard to people and property downstream. In its 2009 
Infrastructure Report Card, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
awarded dams a grade of “D,” noting the lack of funding “to reverse the 
trend of increasingly deteriorating dam infrastructure.”
111
  
 Nationwide, there are 13,990 dams whose failure threatens human 
life.
112
 Twelve dams are currently listed in the Army Corp of Engineer’s 
most dangerous category: “a dam with serious problems and serious 
failure consequences.”
113
 With over 85,000 dams in the United States 
that average over fifty-one years old, the number of dams in this unsafe 
category will only increase as they near the end of their lifespans.
114
 The 
number of high-hazard dams continues to increase as dams age, 
downstream development increases, and more accurate information on 
watersheds and earthquake hazards becomes available.
115
 Repairing all 
                                                 
104. Facts About the Johnstown Flood, JOHNSTOWN FLOOD MUSEUM, 




108. Fountain, supra note 103. 
109. Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring 
America’s Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 101 (1995) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 219 
(1992)). 
110. American Rivers et al., Dam Removal Success Stories, at xiv (1999). 
111. Policy Statement 470—Dam Repair and Rehabilitation, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS 
(June 22, 2011), http://www.asce.org/Content.aspx?id=8338. 
112. Nat’l Inventory of Dams, supra note 27. 
113. Fountain, supra note 103. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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these dams will be expensive. A 2009 report by the Association of State 
Dam Safety Officials estimates at least $50 billion would have to be 
spent to repair high-hazard dams alone.
116
 In order to protect the public 
health, safety, and welfare, these dams must either be repaired or 
removed. Dam safety proceedings present a powerful tool for the 
removal of these dangerous, dated dams. 
1. Federal Dam Safety Programs 
 Many agencies administer dam safety programs at the federal level. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) does not own or 
regulate dams but coordinates federal safety programs through the 
National Dam Safety Program.
117
 The program’s purpose is to 
reduce the risks to life and property from dam failure in the United 
States through the establishment and maintenance of an effective 
national dam safety program to bring together the expertise and re-
sources of the federal and non-federal communities in achieving na-
tional dam safety hazard reduction.
118
 
 While it does not specifically govern or regulate dam removal, the 
National Dam Safety Program encourages cooperation between federal 
and state dam safety efforts and authorizes FEMA to provide grants to 
states for the establishment and maintenance of dam safety programs.
119
 
Other federal agencies are actual owners or operators of dams: the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture,
120
 the Department of Defense,
121
 the 
                                                 
116. Id. 
117. The National Dam Safety Program was created by the Water Resources Development Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, § 215, 110 Stat. 3658, 3685 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 467 (2009)). 
118. Id. 
119. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64. 
120. This includes the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Agriculture Research 
Service, the U.S. Forest Service, the USDA Rural Housing and Community Programs, and the 
USDA Rural Utilities Programs. The U.S. Forest Service owns approximately seven hundred mid-
size dams and administers permits for around two thousand privately owned dams. “The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture is a major planner, designer, financier, constructor, owner, or regulator of 
more than one-third of all the dams in the United States.” FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
EXCERPT FROM THE NATIONAL DAM SAFETY PROGRAM BIENNIAL REPORT 2 (2004-2005), 
available at http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/FederalCommunity/Pages_from_fema576
_Feds_Biennial.pdf. 
121. This includes the Army Corps of Engineers and the Departments of the Air Force, Army 
and Navy who have dam safety responsibility for dams located on their respective bases. The Army 
Corps oversees 631 dams, including 75 Corps hydropower plants and 67 nonfederal power plants. 
The Department of the Army has jurisdiction over 212 dams while the Air Force has 24 and the 
Navy has 33. Id. 
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Department of Interior,
122
 Department of Energy,
123





 and the Tennessee Valley Authority, among others.
126
 
 The Federal Power Act tasks FERC with administering dam safety 
for hydropower projects on (1) navigable streams, (2) public lands of the 
United States, (3) at any Government dam, and (4) on streams over 
which Congress has jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.
127
 Dam 
safety is an integral component of FERC’s hydropower licensing 
program.
128
 Staff at FERC inspect dams on an unscheduled basis, and 
“every five years an independent consulting engineer approved by FERC 
must inspect and evaluate dams higher than 32.8 feet, or with a total 
storage capacity of more than 2,000 acre-feet [of water].”
129
 Where 
FERC identifies safety problems at a dam, it will order the dam owner to 
rectify the problem. These FERC safety inspections have led dam owners 
to voluntarily remove dams where repair costs more than removal. For 
example, a FERC safety inspection of Mussers Dam on Middle Creek in 
Pennsylvania caused the owner to remove the dam rather than make the 
required repairs.
130
 A 2001 report notes that at least four FERC-regulated 
dams have been removed due to the cost of safety repairs.
131
 
  A report by FEMA detailed that FERC staff independently 
reviewed the safety and adequacy of 336 dams by conducting over 4,000 
inspections between 2006 and 2007.
132
 During that period, FERC 
completed forty-four dam safety modifications and seventy-four dam 
safety modifications remained ongoing or under review.
133
 Despite these 
safety measures, there were two major and eighteen minor incidents of 
                                                 
122. The Department of the Interior “is responsible for the planning, design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance of nearly 2,000 dams . . . .” Id. Bureaus in the Department include the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (425 dams), the Bureau of Land Management (515), the Bureau of 
Reclamation (479), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (193), the National Park Service (538), the 
Office of Surface Mining (1,370) and the U.S. Geological Survey (one high-hazard dam) Id. 
123. The Department of Energy owns and had safety jurisdiction over 15 dams. Id.  
124. The Department of Labor is responsible for the safety of 1,395 dams through the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration. Id. 
125. As of September 30, 2005, a total of 2,530 dams were under FERC jurisdiction. Id. 
126. The Tennessee Valley Authority oversees 49 dams. Id. 
127. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Dam Safety in the United States: A Progress Report On 
The National Dam Safety Program 23 (2006–2007), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3677. 
128. Dam Safety and Inspection, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/safety.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
129. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64. 
130. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Order Accepting Surrender of License, American 
Hydro Power Company, 64 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,097 (1993). 
131. Lee Emery, A Review of Non-Federal Hydropower Dams Removed Under FERC's 
Regulatory Authority, Waterpower XII Conference (2001). 
132. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 127. 
133. Id. 
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failure at dams under FERC jurisdiction between 2006 and 2007.
134
 
Considering that more than two-thirds of the approximately 2,600 
hydropower dams within FERC’s jurisdiction are greater than fifty years 
old, these safety inspections will likely result in more voluntary dam 
removals in the future.
135
 
 The final major federal dam safety program is the Indian Dam 
Safety Act of 1994.
136
 It established a dam safety maintenance and repair 
program to maintain certain dams on Indian land that would present a 
threat to human life were structural failure to occur.
137
 In 2005, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs identified 125 high-hazard and significant-
hazard dams, plus over 300 low-hazard dams with the potential to 
become high-hazard dams.
138
 There were over eighty dams still requiring 
major repairs in 2005.
139
 This program, together with the National Dam 
Safety Program and FERC’s mandatory inspections, represent the extent 
of federal dam safety programs. 
 The outlook for dam safety should improve at the federal level 
following the reauthorization of the National Dam Safety Act in 2006.
140
 
This legislation will assist states in improving their dam safety programs, 
support increased technical training for state dam safety engineers and 
technicians, and provide additional funding for dam safety research and 
maintenance of the National Inventory of Dams.
141
 A FEMA report in 
2009 showed that ninety-four percent of federal high-hazard potential 
dams were inspected within the last five years.
142
 Increased safety 
inspections will hopefully result in further voluntary removals of unsafe 
and obsolete dams whose cost to perform necessary safety repairs 
exceeds the price of removal. 
2. State Dam Safety Programs 
 State safety-related dam inspections are responsible for more dam 
removals than federal inspections. In fact, they are “the most common 
legal proceedings resulting in dam removal,”
143
 with “State dam safety 
                                                 
134. Id. at 30. 
135. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 64. 
136. 25 U.S.C. § 3801 (2009). 
137. Id. 
138. Bureau of Indian Affairs—Dam Safety and Dam Maintenance Assessment, 
EXPECTMORE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/detail/10003704.2005.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2010). 
139. Id. 
140. National Inventory of Dams, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://www.usace.army.mil/L
ibrary/Maps/Pages/NationalInventoryofDams.aspx. 
141. Dam Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-460, 120 Stat. 3401. 
142. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, supra note 127. 
143. Bowman, supra note 355, at 739. 
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programs regulat[ing] 80 percent of the 84,000 dams listed in the 
National Inventory of Dams.”
144
 Most states have dam safety laws that 
require the periodic inspection of every dam over a certain size. 
Vermont, for example, regulates dams that are, or will be, capable of 
impounding more than 500,000 cubic feet of water.
145
 A dam of any size 
in Vermont is subject to a safety inspection if ten or more people, or a 
local municipality, petition for an investigation.
146
 The investigative 
findings are then exhibited at a hearing, whereupon the agency having 
jurisdiction makes a determination as to whether the “dam as maintained 
or operated is unsafe or is a menace to people or property.”
147
 Then the 
agency “shall issue an order directing reconstruction, repair, removal, 
breaching, draining or other action it considers necessary to make the 
dam safe.”
148
 Removal of a small unsafe dam typically costs less than 
repairing it. Among ten cases examined by American Rivers, the cost of 




 Consider, for example, a 150-year-old millpond dam in Wisconsin. 
The dam was deemed unsafe by the state Department of Natural 
Resources because of concern that rainstorms, combined with the 
pressure of the millpond, might damage the dam and destroy downstream 
businesses and residences.
150
 The dam owner was ordered to either 
rebuild the dam to meet safety standards or remove it.
151
 With the cost of 
rebuilding the dam estimated at $1 million, the owner felt that rebuilding 
and maintaining the dam would be “too expensive and bothersome.”
152
 
Expenses typically associated with aging dams include increasing 
maintenance costs, liability insurance, and the repeated dredging of silt 
that accumulates behind the impoundment.
153
 The owner also chose 
                                                 
144. ASS'N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, 2010-11 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2011), available 
at http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PDF/Annual%20Reports/AnnualRept_FY11.pdf. 
145. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1082 (2009). 
146. Id. § 1095. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. AM. RIVERS, PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL (2000), available at act.americanrivers.org/site
/DocServer/pdr-color.pdf?docID=727 (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
150. Kelly Smith, Zerwekh Dam Settlement Possible, Suit, LAKE COUNTRY REP., Oct. 17, 
2011, http://www.livinglakecountry.com/lakecountryreporter/news/zerwekh-dam-settlement-
possible-131981513.html. 
151. Kelly Smith, Hearing Rescheduled on Zerwekh Dam Suit, LAKE COUNTRY REP., July 27, 
2011, http://www.livinglakecountry.com/lakecountryreporter/news/126264218.html. 
152. Smith, supra note 150. 
153. Dam Removal, MICH. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., http://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7-
153-10364_52259_27415-80303--,00.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
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 Dam removal is best accomplished as a voluntary undertaking. As 
described above, state and federal dam safety programs can serve as the 
impetus for a dam owner’s decision to remove a dam. Removal of these 
dangerous dams protects people and property plus confers great 
ecological benefits to the watershed. Voluntary removal also avoids any 
Fifth Amendment taking claims from the dam owner—an important 
concern that will be explored in depth below. 
C. FERC and Hydropower Dam Relicensing 
 Voluntary dam removal can also stem from FERC’s hydropower 
licensing process, which must comply with the ESA. To protect 
threatened and endangered fish, FERC attached conditions to the renewal 
of PacifiCorp’s hydropower license for the Condit Dam in Washington 
State. The dam, construction of which began in 1911, did not provide 
fish passage.
155
 After PacifiCorp applied to FERC for a new license, 
FERC issued an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with the 
ESA that required PacifiCorp to update the dam to allow fish passage.
156
 
Modernizing the dam would have cost more than three times the price of 
removal, leading PacifiCorp to choose voluntary removal.
157
 Fourteen 
miles of salmon habitat and thirty-three miles of steelhead habitat were 




 The Condit Dam illustrates FERC’s change of mind that began with 
its unprecedented action at the Edwards Dam in Maine. Recognizing for 
the first time that the ecological cost of dams and the safety hazards they 
pose now tip the public interest in favor of dam removal, FERC ordered 
the decommissioning of a hydropower project where the owner actively 
sought a hydropower license renewal.
159
 This historic action—discussed 
in more detail below—presents a third tool to accomplish dam removal. 
                                                 
154. Smith, supra note 150. 
155. Linda V. Mapes, Condit Dam To Be Demolished Wednesday, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 
25, 2011, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016606447_condit26m.htm
l. 
156. Associated Press, Condit Dam Breached to Help Local Fish, SEATTLEPI.COM, Oct. 26, 
2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Condit-Dam-breached-2238048.php. 
157. Id. (The Condit Dam was removed on October 26, 2011) 
158. “Before construction, historical accounts from Yakama tribal members indicated some 
8,000 adult salmon and steelhead returned to the river.” Mapes, supra note 155. 
159. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 
(1997) (order denying new license and requiring dam removal). 
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1. The Statutory Scheme for Hydropower Licensing 
 The potential removal of any private, municipal, or state 
hydropower dam will involve FERC.
160
 Federal hydropower dams, on 
the other hand, are authorized by Congress and constructed by the 
Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and are subject to National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and ESA requirements.
161
 
 Hydropower projects are regulated by FERC pursuant to the Federal 
Power Act (FPA).
162
 The FPA requires a license for the construction and 
maintenance of a hydropower project if it is on, or affects, navigable 
waters, public land, or reservations, or if it uses surplus water from any 
government dam.
163
 In addition, a license may be required for a project 




 During hydropower’s heyday—in 1940 over 1,500 hydropower 
plants produced about one-third of the United States’ electricity
165
—
FERC issued thousands of hydropower licenses. These operating licenses 
are valid for between thirty and fifty years.
166
 When a license expires, the 
dam owner must reapply to FERC to obtain a new license.
167
 As part of 
this relicensing process, FERC must determine whether issuing a new 
license is in the public interest by giving equal consideration to power 
and nonpower uses of the river: 
In deciding whether to issue any license under this Part for any pro-
ject, the Commission, in addition to the power and development 
purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal considera-
tion to the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitiga-
tion of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including 
                                                 
160. THE HEINZ CTR., supra note 4, at 61. 
161. Id. Note that FERC also regulates private hydropower dams on federal land. For example, 
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Olympic National Park. Elwha River Restoration: Background and History, AM. RIVERS, 
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163. Id. § 797(e). Navigable waters “means those parts of streams or other bodies of water over 
which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regulate commerce . . . and which either in 
their natural or improved condition . . . are used or suitable for use for the transportation or persons 
or property in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .” Id. § 796(8). 
164. Id. § 817. 
165. The History of Hydropower Development in the United States, BUREAU OF 
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REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/regulation/origin.asp 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational 




This section of the FPA, section 4(e), is referred to as the equal 
consideration requirement. 
 In 1994, FERC issued a policy statement asserting authority under 
the FPA “to deny new licenses to hydroelectric projects when existing 
licenses expire.”
169
 This authority comes from Section 10(a) of the FPA 
and represents the core of FERC’s licensing responsibilities.
170
 Known as 
the “comprehensive development standard,” Section 10(a) reads: 
That the project adopted . . . will be best adapted to a comprehen-
sive scheme for improving and developing a waterway or water-
ways for the use and benefit of interstate and foreign commerce, for 
the improvement and utilization of water power development, for 
the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and 
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for 
other beneficial public uses . . . .
171
 
 A third important provision of the FPA is Section 10(j), which 
requires expressly that in every license it issues, FERC must establish 
conditions for the adequate and equitable protection of, mitigation of 
damages to, and enhancement of fish and wildlife.
172
 These three 
provisions of the FPA form the current statutory scheme within which 
FERC operates when issuing hydropower licenses—a scheme that tasks 
FERC with reaching “an appropriate balance between power . . . and the 
protection of nondevelopment resources, such as fish and wildlife.”
173
 
This balance can normally be accommodated through license conditions, 
but as the 1994 policy statement asserted, where conditioning authority is 
“inadequate to do the job, i.e., where there was unacceptable 
environmental damage that proved irremediable . . . [FERC] does not 
read the Act as requiring it to issue a license.”
174
 If a license cannot be 
crafted that comports with the standards set forth in Section 10(a), FERC 
has the power to deny the license.
175
 
                                                 
168. Id. § 797. 
169. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33. 
170. Id. at 342 (“[T]he strictures of section 10(a), which the courts have long recognized rests 
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172. Id. § 803(j). 
173. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 342. 
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 Outright denial of a license is, of course, highly unusual. The more 
likely scenario is that the issuance of a license will be conditioned upon 
environmental mitigation measures, and the licensee may be unwilling to 
accept the conditions because they render the project unprofitable.
176
 In 
such a case, the hydropower project may have to shut down. The 
Commission rejects the notion that “a condition in a power license is per 
se unreasonable if, as a result of imposing the condition, the project is no 
longer economically viable.”
177
 The statute calls for a balancing of 
development and nondevelopment interests. To favor power and 
development interests over environmental concerns is contrary to the 
Federal Power Act.
178
 Furthermore, the Act makes no guarantee of 
profitability.
179
 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “there 
can be no guarantee of profitability of water power projects under the 
Federal Power Act; profitability is at risk from a number of variable 
factors, and values other than profitability require appropriate 
consideration.”
180
 Consequently, FERC is free to condition the issuance 
of a hydropower license on protecting or restoring environmental values, 
even if the cost of meeting these conditions makes the project 
economically unviable and forces it to shut down. And when a 
hydropower project shuts down, the 1994 policy statement stipulates that 
the project owner is responsible for the costs of decommissioning, which 
can include dam removal.
181
 
 The Commission does not have to wait until the end of a license 
term to order decommissioning. Section 6 of the FPA governs surrender 
or termination of a license.
182
 A licensee can explicitly or implicitly 
apply for license surrender.
183
 The terms of some licenses even expressly 
permit the Commission to order decommissioning within the license 
term.
184
 Finally, the Commission can also initiate a revocation 
proceeding.
185









180. Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994). 
181. “[N]ormally . . . the Commission anticipates that the licensee will be responsible for 
paying the costs (up to a reasonable level) of the steps needed to decommission the project, since the 
licensee created the project and benefitted from its operations . . . .” FERC Policy Statement, supra 
note 33, at 346. 
182. 18 C.F.R. § 6.1 (2007). 
183. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 344 n.43. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. Sections 26 and 31 of the FPA govern revocation proceedings. 
186. Id. 
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2. The Statutory Scheme in Action: FERC Orders the Historic Re-
moval of the Edwards Dam 
 In 1997, FERC made history. For the first time ever, it denied an 
application for hydropower license renewal and instead ordered the 
Edwards Dam in Maine be decommissioned.
187
 The Edwards Dam was 
built on the Kennebec River in 1837 to provide mechanical power for 
mills.
188
 Electrical power generators were installed in 1913 to provide 
power for Edwards Manufacturing Co.
189
 The mill closed in the 1980s, 
but electrical power generation continued with the company contracting 
to sell the electricity.
190
 With the hydropower project license set to expire 




 The Commission’s response was unheard-of: the license was denied 
and removal of the dam was ordered, even though the licensee actively 
sought a new license.
192
 Explaining its reasoning behind the order, the 
Commission states: 
We believe that the public interest in this proceeding lies in our 
denying the license application and requiring the licensees to re-
move Edwards Dam. The environmental benefits of so doing sub-
stantially outweigh the environmental benefits of relicensing, even 
with extensive mitigation measures. . . . A critical factor is that sev-
eral important fish species native to the Kennebec River cannot be 
restored to their historical habitat without dam removal, because of 
their inability to use fish passage facilities.
193
 
 For the removal of private, state, and municipal hydropower dams, 
the events at Edwards Dam illustrate the power of FERC’s licensing 
process and the triumph of the public interest. The federal government 
has finally recognized the value of a free-flowing river over electric 
power generation and private profit: “[B]y the time the first licenses 
began to expire, the concept of the inevitability of power operation from 
a particular project was eroding.”
194
 
 The Commission’s policy statement and the decommissioning of 
the Edwards Dam were unprecedented uses of its power under the FPA, 
                                                 
187. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 
(1997) (order denying new license and requiring dam removal). 
188. Edwards Dam Removal Update, ME. STATE PLANNING OFFICE, www.maine.gov/spo/spec
ialprojects/docs/edwsdam_theriverrunsfree.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 (1997). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 342. 
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and some are now questioning whether it acted within the bounds of its 
authority. The hydroelectric industry, for example, has claimed that 
FERC lacks authority to impose conditions that make a project 
economically unviable, and that such an action is both a breach of 
contract and a Fifth Amendment taking of private property when the 
licensee receives no compensation.
195
 The Commission also asserts 
authority to order dam removal at the owner’s expense.
196
 Under current 




 The Edwards Dam removal avoided these issues because all parties 
actively involved in the relicensing signed a settlement agreement 
providing for a transfer of the dam’s ownership to the State of Maine for 
dam removal purposes.
198
 Funding for the removal will come entirely 
from private sources.
199
 Dam removal costs and a decade of fish 
restoration efforts are to be financed principally by upriver dam owners 
(in exchange for delaying their fish passage obligations) and by a 
downstream shipbuilder (as mitigation for expanding its shipyard 
operations).
200
 As many of the hydropower industry’s arguments remain 
unaddressed by courts, the following analysis will explore whether a 
valid Fifth Amendment taking claim may result where dam removal is 
ordered. 
III. TESTING FOR A FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING 
 Dam removal may result in a number of Fifth Amendment taking 
claims from affected parties. A taking claim asserts that a government 
action has “taken” a protected property interest without the necessary 
eminent domain proceedings. The Constitution offers protection from 
takings: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”
201
 This allows a property owner to sue the 
government and seek compensation for the private property taken. 
Generally, three forms of a taking are recognized: a physical taking, a 
regulatory taking, and a hybrid of both known as an exaction.
202
 
                                                 
195. Beth Bryant, FERC’s Dam Decommissioning Authority Under the Federal Power Act, 74 
WASH. L. REV. 95, 98 (1999). 
196. FERC Policy Statement, supra note 33, at 346. 
197. Id. at 340. 
198. Am. Rivers, Friends of the Earth & Trout Unlimited, Dam Removal Success Stories: 
Restoring Rivers Through Selective Removal of Dams that Don’t Make Sense 61 (1999). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
202. Only the first two forms will receive in-depth examination. An exaction is a hybrid 
between a physical and regulatory taking that occurs when the government attaches a condition on 
the development of land. The landowner must agree to dedicate a portion of the land for a public 
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A. Physical Taking 
 When the government physically invades private property, or causes 
it to be invaded by persons or things, a physical taking has occurred.
203
 
Under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., permanent 
physical occupations of property are per se takings.
204
 Examples include 
“flooding from a government dam that is continuous or at least inevitably 
recurring, regular and low overflights by government airplanes, 
government installation of relatively permanent structures on private 
property[, and] shoreline erosion caused by government jetties.”
205
 “In 
contrast with regulatory takings, [discussed next,] the magnitude of the 
intrusion[,] the economic impact on the property owner, or the 
importance of the government interest advanced,” are “immaterial” in the 
context of a physical taking.
206
 
 Appropriations of private property to the government are given the 
same per se treatment as permanent physical occupations: “The 
paradigmatic taking . . . is a direct government appropriation or physical 
invasion of private property.”
207
 Recently, when the amount of water 
available to water rights holders from federal reclamation projects was 
reduced in order to protect fish listed under the ESA it was treated as a 
physical—rather than a regulatory—taking.
208
  
B. Regulatory Taking 
 The Fifth Amendment protection from taking, once limited to 
physical occupation of property, now encompasses protection from 
government regulation that “goes too far.”
209
 Courts have developed 
several tests to determine when a regulation goes too far, believing that 
the Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”
210
 Total regulatory taking 
claims are subject to the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
211
 test, 
                                                                                                             
purpose. ROBERT MELTZ, SUBSTANTIVE TAKINGS LAW: A PRIMER 38 (2009). Exactions typically do 
not arise in the context of dam removal. 
203. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic taking 
requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private 
property.”). 
204. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
205. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 34. 
206. Id. 
207. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. 
208. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
209. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
210. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 15 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
211. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992). 
26 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 2:1 
while partial regulatory taking claims are decided under the Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York test.
212
 
1. The Lucas “Total Taking” Rule 
 In Lucas, a South Carolina statute prohibited the building of 
permanent structures on beachfront real estate.
213
 Petitioner Lucas argued 
that because the regulation prohibited development of his beachfront lots 
the regulation amounted to a taking of property.
214
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed and held that just compensation is required if the regulation 
deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of the land, 
regardless of any public purpose that the regulation may serve.
215
  
 Two important caveats come with this holding. First, despite a total 
elimination of use and/or value, a restriction is not a taking if it merely 
duplicates what could have been achieved under “background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance,” which existed when the 
owner acquired title to the property.
216
 These background principles limit 
the rights acquired by the property owner, meaning there can be no 
taking when the government restriction eliminates a right the landowner 
never possessed. One cannot lose a right that one never had. 
 Second, the “total taking” must deprive the landowner of one 
hundred percent of the property’s use and/or value for a Lucas claim. In 
Lucas, the Court specifically acknowledged that a landowner suffering a 
ninety-five percent loss of value would not come under the total taking 
rule.
217
 Consequently, regulation that denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land is relatively rare.
218
 
2. Penn Central’s “Partial Regulatory Taking” Test 
 For regulations that remove less than one hundred percent of the 
property’s use and/or value, the Penn Central balancing framework is 
used. “To determine whether a partial regulatory taking has occurred, 
examine the government action for its (1) economic impact on the 
property owner, (2) degree of interference with the owner’s ‘distinct’ 
investment-backed expectations, and (3) ‘character of government 
                                                 
212. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
213. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007–08. 
214. Id. at 1009. 
215. See id. at 1015 (“The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment 
appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”). 
216. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
217. Id. at 1019 n.8. 
218. Id. at 1018. 
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action.’ ”
219
 Courts will generally assess all three factors, although any 
single factor, if sufficiently compelling, can be conclusive that a taking 
has occurred.
220
 The Court has shed little light on the content of each of 




 The first Penn Central factor, economic impact, is measured by 
most courts in terms of remaining economic use, but the Federal Circuit 
and Court of Federal Claims focus instead on remaining market value.
222
 
For this factor to favor a taking, the economic impact must be “very 
substantial, arguably severe, when the other factors are not 
determinative.”
223
 The degree of economic loss must be so severe as to 
be the functional equivalent of a physical invasion or physical 
appropriation of the land.
224
 Even deprivation of a parcel’s “highest and 
best” use is not, without more, a taking.
225
 Some decisions have noted the 
importance of leaving the landowner with the possibility of a “reasonable 
return,” usually in the context of a pre-existing property use.
226
 The 
Federal Circuit and CFC use the recoupment of cost as a metric for 
economic impact.
227
 This is the formula preferred by a hydropower 
project owner seeking to recover its cost basis in the project. 
 The second Penn Central factor, investment-backed expectations, 
“is often seen as having two steps: (1) [d]id the claimant have actual 
investment-backed expectations[,] and (2) [w]ere those expectations 
objectively reasonable?”
228
 It is worth noting that those who voluntarily 
enter a heavily regulated field are presumed to lack a reasonable 
expectation that the legislature will not enact new requirements as 
necessary.
229
 Hydropower is certainly a heavily regulated field, so 
                                                 
219. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 16 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
220. Id. 
221. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
222. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 19. 
223. Id. 
224. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
225. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). “Highest and best 
use” refers to the reasonably probable and physically possible, legal use of a property resulting in the 
greatest value. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 20. 
226. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(ninety-six percent reduction in rate of return favors the existence of a taking). 
227. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“In determining the severity of economic impact, the owner’s opportunity to recoup its investment 
or better . . . cannot be ignored.”); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 266 (2001) (“[C]ase law 
thus makes it clear that profit or return on investment is a factor to be considered in assessing 
economic impact. . . .”), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
228. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 22. 
229. Id. at 23. 
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projects owners can be presumed to lack reasonable investment-backed 
expectations when operating in a constantly evolving regulatory field. 
 The third and final Penn Central factor looks to the character of the 
government action. This includes the government’s purpose and the 
regulation’s value, public benefit, or effectiveness. Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., however, suggests that this factor is less important than the 
previous two Penn Central factors.
230
 
 One final quirk of the Penn Central test is the parcel as a whole 
rule. Any given parcel of land includes three dimensions: spatial, 
functional, and temporal.
231
 But the law of takings “does not divide a 
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated . . . this Court 
focuses . . . [on the] extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as 
a whole . . . .”
232
 Described another way, “where an owner possess a full 
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle 
is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”
233
 
 This rule is not always followed as it is not applied in cases where 
the property rights are considered so fundamental as to tolerate little or 
no infringement.
234
 Generally, however, a property owner must be 
deprived of all economically viable use of the entire parcel of property, 
not just a portion of the parcel, to support a finding that a regulatory 
taking has occurred. 
IV. TAKING CLAIMS FROM DAM OWNERS 
A. FERC’s Decommissioning of a Hydropower Dam 
 When FERC issues an order to decommission, a hydropower 
license is denied, the dam structure is destroyed, and future revenues 
from hydropower generation are lost. Is compensation due to the project 
owners? The first inquiry in any takings claim is whether the claimant 
can point to a protected property interest. This necessitates determining 
the nature of the licensee’s property interest. Dam owners may claim a 
property interest in the entire hydropower project or in the project’s 
several smaller component interests. These include the project works, 
surrounding lands, and water use rights. 
                                                 
230. Id. at 24. 
231. Id. at 28. 
232. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)). 
233. Id. 
234. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 30. An example includes the fundamental right to bequeath 
property. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
2012] Let the River Run 29 
 If the licensee has a property interest, the reduction of the economic 
value of that property by the regulation must be calculated, looking at the 
licensee’s parcel as a whole. Where one hundred percent of the 
property’s economic value is lost, the Lucas test requires 
compensation.
235
 If less than a total loss of all economic value occurs, the 
Penn Central test must be applied. Thus, whether a dam owner is entitled 
to just compensation for any of these interests will depend on the nature 
of the property interest and the extent of the loss in economic value of 
the property. 
1. Loss of the Dam and Other Associated Structures 
 When a hydropower project owner is ordered to remove the dam, as 
was the case with the Edwards Dam,
236
 the owner may claim a total one 
hundred percent loss in the economic value of the dam and other 
associated structures removed from the water. These taking claims are 
easily defeated on two grounds. 
 First, the parcel as a whole rule should defeat most taking claims by 
project owners. Under both Penn Central and Lucas, a court must assess 
the economic loss to the property owner compared with what the owner 
still has.
237
 In performing this assessment, courts look to the parcel as a 
whole. Even after FERC orders removal of a hydropower dam on a 
nonnavigable river, some portions of the property—those on land—
remain unaffected, and even those that are affected retain some economic 
uses other than hydropower generation. The licensee is normally free to 
develop or resell the remaining surrounding land. 
 Second, while the parcel as a whole rule discussed above should 
defeat most taking claims, the federal navigation servitude can also 
render many takings claims inappropriate—so long as the dam is located 
on a navigable waterway. The servitude is a right held for the public in 
all navigable-for-title waters.
238
 In practical effect, it is an interest that 
permits the federal government to destroy private, state-recognized 
property rights for the benefit of public navigation without paying 
compensation for a taking of property. 
 Authority for the navigation servitude comes from the Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
239
 Power to regulate commerce 
                                                 
235. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 187–95. 
237. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
238. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 394 (1907) (holding forced 
modifications to an obstructing bridge under the Rivers and Harbors Act noncompensable). 
239. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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necessarily includes power to regulate navigation.
240
 The government 
“may legislate to forbid or license dams in waters; its power over 
improvements for navigation in rivers is absolute.”
241
 The Supreme Court 
has recognized that the “right to control, improve, and regulate the 
navigation of [navigable] waters is one of the greatest of the powers 
delegated to the United States by the power to regulate commerce.”
242
 
 When this right conflicts with private property rights, “they are not 
to be reconciled as between equals, but the private interest must give way 
to a superior right, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that as 
against the Government such private interest is not a right at all.”
243
 
Private title to submerged lands is subservient to the government’s 
interest in improving navigation.
244
 To require otherwise “would be to 
create private claims in the public domain.”
245
 The servitude applies to 
any government action that aids navigation.
246
 All dams in navigable 
waters therefore exist subordinate to the federal navigation servitude. As 
a result, Lucas’s background principles of property and nuisance
247
 
prevent the dam owner from ever acquiring the right to obstruct a 
navigable water; there can be no taking of a right never possessed.
248
 
Dam owners will not have a taking claim for loss of the physical dam 
structure so long as it is located on a navigable waterway. 
                                                 
240. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1824) (“The power of Congress, then, 
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that navigation may 
be, in any manner, connected with commerce with foreign nations, or among the several 
States . . . .”). 
241. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1940). 
242. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1912). 
243. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945). 
244. See Lewis, 229 U.S. at 87 (“If the public right of navigation is the dominant right, and if, 
as much the case, the title of the owner of the bed of navigable waters holds subject absolutely to the 
public right of navigation, this dominant right must include the right to use the bed of the water for 
every purpose which is in aid of navigation.”). 
245. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967) (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724–25 (1866)). 
246. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 657, 674 (Fed. Cl., 2003) (“[T]he 
presence of multiple governmental purposes, so long as navigation is one of those purposes, will not 
defeat a navigational servitude defense.”). But cf. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 
725, 739 (1950) (finding the Central Valley Project was a reclamation project and not a navigation 
project, despite a general Congressional declaration that the project’s purpose was to improve 
navigation). 
247. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
248. Id. at 1028–29 (preexisting federal navigation servitude bars physical taking); see also 
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 88 (1912) (holding that implicit in the 
navigation servitude is that title to submerged lands is subject to the government’s interest in 
improving navigation, and the Court also held no private property was taken that would entitle the 
plaintiff to compensation). 
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2. Loss of Lands Surrounding the Hydropower Project 
 If the Edwards Dam removal
249
 serves as a bellwether—and there is 
no reason why it should not—a dam removal order will typically not 
deprive the licensee of the surrounding project lands. The Edwards Dam 
removal order required removal of the dam, but did not order the 
surrender of any land.
250
 Even though the water may no longer be used to 
produce power, a dam removal order does not deprive the land of all 
economic value. Again, the licensee remains free to sell or develop the 
remaining riparian land. Consequently, a Penn Central (less than total 
taking) analysis is appropriate. 
 Examining the economic impact upon which the Penn Central 
inquiry “turns in large part, albeit not exclusively,”
251
 it is clear that loss 
of the economic value of electricity generation will constitute a large 
percentage of the land’s preregulation value. The Supreme Court has 
never specified a set percentage minimum reduction in value for a taking, 
nor does any amount (short of one hundred percent) automatically 
establish a taking.
252
 If Lingle serves as a guide, the regulatory taking 
must be the functional equivalent of a physical occupation or 
appropriation of the land.
253
 A mere diminution in property value, even 
as great as 92.5%, cannot by itself establish a taking.
254
 Even deprivation 
of a hydropower parcel’s most profitable, “highest and best use,” electric 
power generation, is not, without more, a taking.
255
 Some decisions have 
noted the importance of leaving the claimant with a “reasonable return,” 
or the ability to recoup costs, yet such an argument is easily defeated by 
the fixed duration of a hydropower license, which project owners enter 
into knowingly and with no guarantee of renewal or recoupment of 
investment.
256
 While the economic impact may be severe to the project 
owner, the reduction in value is less than one hundred percent. The first 
of the three Penn Central factors therefore does not conclusively 
establish a regulatory taking. 
 Moving to the second factor, the degree of interference with the 
owner’s investment-backed expectations, the license’s limited duration 
and terms also weigh against the reasonableness of any “distinct” 
                                                 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 187–200. 
250. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,255 (1997). 
251. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). 
252. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 317. 
253. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
254. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (a seventy-
five percent diminution in value not a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) 
(reduction in value of tract of land from $800,000 to $60,000 (a 92.5% diminution) not a taking). 
255. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). 
256. See infra text accompanying notes 259–75. 
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investment-backed expectations as contemplated by the Penn Central 
inquiry. Courts have agreed with FERC: there is no guarantee of 
profitability under the Federal Power Act.
257
 Hydropower project owners 
cannot reasonably expect that the land will forever remain profitable. 
Finally, Penn Central’s third factor, the character of the government 
action, also does not favor a taking as the government’s action will 
always bestow a public benefit. The Commission cannot issue a 
decommission order unless it is in the public interest.
258
 None of the 
three Penn Central factors conclusively establishes a regulatory taking. 
Hydropower project owners should not prevail on any taking claims for 
economic loss of the project’s surrounding lands. 
3. Investment-Backed Expectations: the Hydropower License as a 
Protected Entitlement 
 Licensees may also claim a vested property right in the license to 
install and operate the dam,
259
 at least to the extent that a reasonable 
return could be achieved or the capital investment in the project 
recovered.
260
 Under the second part of the Penn Central regulatory 
taking test, the court looks to the degree of interference with the owner’s 
investment-backed expectations. Under this part of the test, the court 
asks two questions: (1) Did the claimant have actual investment-backed 
expectations? And (2) were those expectations objectively reasonable?
261
 
Some decisions applying Penn Central’s partial regulatory taking test 
“note the importance of leaving the claimant with a ‘reasonable return.’ 
”
262
 This element is most relevant where the regulation threatens a 
property use that existed when the investment was made or the property 
acquired.
263
 The so-called notice rule, however, says that no regulatory 
taking can occur when the government restricts use of the parcel under 
laws or regulations that existed at the time it was acquired.
264
 Although it 
is now given less-than-dispositive weight, many court decisions “give 
substantial, almost dispositive weight to pre-acquisition regulatory 
                                                 
257. Wis. Public Service Corp. v. FERC, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994); FERC Policy 
Statement, supra note 33. 
258. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
259. Carney, supra note 9, at 335. 
260. Katherine Costenbader, Comment, Damning Dams: Bearing the Cost of Restoring 
America’s Rivers, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 656 (1998). 
261. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
262. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 21. 
263. See, e.g., Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323, 1328 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We also have 
made clear that . . . the distinct investment-backed expectations factor of the Penn Central test is to 
be judged at the time the personal property was acquired.”). 
264. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 22. 
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 This notice rule poses an even greater obstacle for plaintiffs in 
heavily regulated fields.
266
 Players in such fields are presumed to lack a 
reasonable expectation that the regulatory environment will not change 
as the legislature enacts new requirements and reforms.
267
 Employee 
pension plans, coal mining, liquor stores, banking, gaming, the sale of 
firearms, and adult entertainment establishments are all considered by 
courts to be heavily regulated fields.
268
 Electric power generation is 
certainly also heavily regulated. Project owners’ investment-backed 
expectations are not objectively reasonable when operating in the 
constantly evolving regulatory field of hydropower. While an order to 
decommission a hydropower project “particularly interferes” with the 
primary use or owner’s expectation for the parcel,
269
 the heavily 
regulated nature of the field continues to weigh against the objective 
reasonableness of any investment-backed expectation necessary for a 
regulatory taking. 
 There is also a more fundamental reason to refuse to recognize an 
objectively reasonable investment-backed expectation. As a matter of 
policy, the idea that there is an obligation on the part of the government 
to renew a license runs contrary to Congress’s motive for limiting license 
terms.
270
 The renewal licensing process is designed to provide an 
opportunity to reevaluate whether renewal of the hydropower licenses 
serves the current public interest.
271
  
                                                 
265. Id. at 23 (citing Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(federal surface mining statute); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(federal surface mining statute); and United States v. Donovan, 466 F. Supp. 2d 590 (D. Del. 2006) 
(federal wetlands permitting program)). 
266. Id. (“Those who voluntarily enter a “heavily regulated field” find regulatory takings 
claims particularly difficult to maintain.”). 
267. Id. 
268. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 
602, 645–46 (1993) (employee pension plans); Appolo Fuels, 381 F.3d at 1349 (coal mining); 
People’s Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F. Supp. 2d 200, 215 (D. Mass. 2006) (liquor 
stores); Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (banking); Hawkeye 
Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 442 (8th Cir. 2007) (gaming); Akins v. 
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 619, 623 (Fed. Cl. 2008) (the sale of firearms); McCrothers Corp. v. City 
of Mandan, 728 N.W.2d 124, 141 (N.D. 2007) (adult entertainment establishments). 
269. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 24. 
270. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2009) (“Licenses . . . shall not be issued for a period exceeding fifty 
years.”). 
271. The FPA protects the public interest: “[T]he project adopted . . . will be best adapted . . . 
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water 
power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife . . 
. and for other beneficial uses . . . .” Id. § 803(a). 
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 Since a hydropower project is constructed under a license of limited 
duration, and with no guarantee of renewal, the project owner cannot 
claim a protected entitlement to make economic use of the facilities it 
constructed in order to take advantage of the original FERC license.
272
 
Licenses are a privilege, not a right.
273
 As the Supreme Court opined, 
“[P]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source . . . .”
274
 
Once the license expires, the contract between the licensee and the 
government ends and the property right is extinguished.
275
  
4. Property Interests in the Value of the Water Power and the Land 
as a Hydropower Site  
 A project owner may claim a property interest in the potential value 
of the water power or land as a hydropower site. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently rejected this claim.
276
 In United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., the government exercised the 
federal navigation servitude and revoked Chandler-Dunbar’s hydropower 
license.
277
 Although Chandler-Dunbar owned the riparian land, the Court 
noted it “had no such vested property right in the water power inherent in 
the falls and rapids of the river.”
278
 The federal government’s dominant 
right to take the navigable river flow for interstate commerce defeated 
compensation claims for the loss of water for power production.
279
 The 
                                                 
272. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (holding revocation of a fishery’s permits under the 1997 and 1998 Appropriations Acts which 
would bar it from receiving future permits did not constitute a regulatory taking of the fishery’s 
vessel). 
273. See Acceptance Ins. Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting a 
claim by an insurance company that a decision of the Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management 
Agency not to approve the claimant’s planned sale of a portfolio of crop insurance policies is a 
taking because such sales are subject to pervasive federal regulatory review). For more on the 
“heavily regulated industry” concept, see MELTZ, supra note 202, at 23. 
274. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984). 
275. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 (“[P]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source . . . .”). 
276. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 68–69 (1913) 
(holding a project owner does not acquire a property interest in the water power value of a site); 
United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 236 (1960) (finding Fifth Amendment 
compensation provision does not apply to lost water power value or opportunity to produce 
hydropower); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 223 (1956) (stating that “the 
exclusion of riparian owners from the benefits of the power in a navigable stream without 
compensation is entirely within the Government’s discretion.”). 
277. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 67. 
278. Id. at 76. 
279. Id. at 74. 
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hydropower project was “placed in the river under a permit which the 
company knew was likely to be revoked at any time” on account of the 
federal navigation servitude.
280
 Speaking eloquently, the Court held that 
the hydropower owner has no property interest in the water power value 
of a site: “[T]hat the running water in a great navigable stream is capable 
of private ownership is inconceivable.”
281
  
5. Loss of Water Rights 
 A hydropower licensee may argue that denial of a hydropower 
license deprives it of either some or all of the value of its water rights, 
but no vested property right exists in the value of water to generate 
electricity,
282
 and a licensee maintains whatever water use rights it had 
prior to decommissioning. In states that follow the prior appropriation 
system of water rights, however, a licensee’s water rights may be 
completely lost after a hydropower license is denied. Prior appropriation 
is the predominant water rights allocation system in the western United 
States.
283
 Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, available water is 
allocated on a first-come, first-served basis to anyone who puts the water 
to a beneficial off-stream use.
 284
  
 Unlike the riparian water use system, mere ownership of land does 
not give rights to water use.
285
 To possess a water right in a prior 
appropriation system, three criteria must be satisfied: (1) there must be 
an intent to apply the water to a beneficial use, (2) there must be an 
actual diversion of water from its natural source, and (3) there must be 
continued application of the water to a beneficial use.
286
 This beneficial 
use requirement means that the hydropower licensee would lose its 
appropriative water right by ceasing to make a beneficial use of the right 
following dam removal.
287
 Alaska, for example, broadly defines 
beneficial uses to include the protection of fish and wildlife habitat, 
                                                 
280. Id. at 68. 
281. Id. at 69. 
282. See supra notes 167–75 and accompanying text. 
283. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Water Appropriation Systems, WESTERN STATES WATER LAWS, 
http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/appsystems.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2012). 




287. Id. at 157. Sax posits that the doctrine of beneficial use may be able to impose a new 
requirement on a hydropower dam to maintain specified flows at specified times for fish and 
recreation if the original hydropower appropriation is deemed no longer beneficial. 
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recreation and parks, navigation, and sanitation and water quality.
288
 
Wyoming, however, only recognizes fisheries as a beneficial use, so 
unless the project owner applies its water right to fish propagation, it 
would lose its water right.
289
 
 Sadly, seemingly beneficial uses like the preservation of the natural 
environment are not viewed as “beneficial” by all states. This creates 
disincentives—if not roadblocks—to applying water rights toward 
conservation efforts. State statutes generally provide for a loss of water 
rights through forfeiture, defined as unexcused non-use for a period of 
years.
290
 The extent of the economic loss from the water right will also 
depend on how forgiving the state is in authorizing changes in use or 
transfers to new diverters. Most prior appropriation states impose strict 
conditions on, or disallow, the transfer of nonconsumptive uses to 
consumptive ones.
291
 Hydropower generation is a nonconsumptive use.
292
 
Granted, protection of fish and wildlife habitat are nonconsumptive uses, 
but they have little economic worth to the licensee. If the licensee is 
unable to transfer the water right, or put it to beneficial use, a total loss 
of the value of the water right may occur, necessitating a Lucas taking 
inquiry. 
 The state’s appropriative system may also be subject to the public 
trust doctrine, which holds that water is public property belonging to all 
the citizens of a state.
293
 The public trust doctrine precludes anyone from 
acquiring a vested right to harm the public trust and imposes a continuing 
duty on the state to take public uses into account when allocating water 
resources. In California, the public trust doctrine is subsumed in the 
state’s water rights system.
294
 Colorado, however, has rejected the public 
trust doctrine.
295
 The extent to which the public trust doctrine may limit a 
hydropower project owner’s compensable property interest in water 
                                                 
288. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Western States Instream Flow Summary, WESTERN STATES 
WATER LAWS, http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/stateflowsummary.html (last visited Jan. 16, 
2012). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 125. 
291. William Goldfarb, Water Law 34–35. (2d ed. 1988). 
292. James J. Jacobs & Donald J. Brosz, Wyoming's Water Resources (June 1993) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://library.wrds.uwyo.edu/wrp/93-12/93-12.html. 
293. See In Re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 440–41 (Haw. 2000) (upholding 
the use of the public trust doctrine to force appropriators to release impounded water for the benefit 
of a stream). 
294. Nat'l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine City, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983) 
(holding reallocation of water for scenic preservation is not a taking under the Fifth Amendment 
because the water rights holder’s property interest was subject to the public trust). 
295. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (holding that the framers of the state 
constitution intended that the waters of natural streams be dedicated to appropriation and use). 
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rights thus depends upon the law of the state in which the project is 
located. 
 Even in states that follow the riparian system of water rights, a 
licensee may have a very limited ability to use or market its water use 
rights following project decommissioning and dam removal. In a riparian 
system, the right to use water is defined in terms of ownership of riparian 
land.
296
 Riparian lands are the portions of a parcel that abut a water body. 
Water rights are owned by the property owner riparian to the 
waterway.
297
 Historically, the use of water on distant, nonriparian 
parcels, though owned by a riparian landowner within the same 
watershed, was viewed as unreasonable.
298
 This limitation is still in 
effect, although modern reasonable use jurisdictions now generally 
require proof of actual harm caused by the water’s use on nonriparian 
lands.
299
 The riparian system further restricts water rights by limiting 
their use to an owner’s land within the same watershed.
300
 Most 
jurisdictions view water use outside the watershed as per se 
unreasonable, but many will not prevent it unless another riparian is 
actually harmed.
301
 These limitations on use, combined with the 
appurtenant, place-specific nature of riparian rights, can render a project 
owner’s remaining water rights difficult to transfer. 
 In conclusion, a decommissioning order does not deprive a licensee 
of its water use rights; the licensee maintains whatever water use rights it 
had prior to decommissioning. The FPA does not affect state laws or 
water rights.
302
 Any limitations on the use or transferability of those 
water rights are a result of state law, making the limitations Lucas 
background principles of property that prevent the licensee from ever 
possessing the rights in the first place.
303
 This simple precept should bar 
taking claims from project owners in all states and water rights systems 
for any loss of water rights due to FERC’s license denial and 
decommissioning order. Complaints concerning the marketability of 
residual water use rights should be directed at state legislatures, not the 
federal government. 
                                                 
296. David H. Getches, Water Law in a Nut Shell 24 (4th ed. 2009). 
297. SAX, supra note 284, at 27. 
298. Id. at 53. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. at 30. 
301. Id. at 31. 
302. 16 U.S.C. § 821 (2009) (“Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or 
intending to affect or in any way interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the 
control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water . . . or any vested right acquired therein.”). 
303. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
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 The preceding analysis shows that FERC faces little liability from 
project owners when denying renewal of a hydropower license and 
issuing a dam removal order to serve the public interest. An order from 
FERC to decommission a hydropower project and remove a dam will not 
result in a compensable Fifth Amendment taking. Hydropower project 
licensees generally lack the prerequisite vested property interests 
required for a taking, and any effects on truly vested property interests 
fail to qualify as a compensable taking. 
B. The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Taking Claims 
1. The Doctrine of Public Ownership of Wildlife 
 The ESA has frequently been attacked under the Fifth Amendment 
taking doctrine. Opponents of the ESA have argued that its true purpose 
“is really about [the] unconstitutional, uncompensated taking of private 
property.”
304
 This argument came to a head with the proposed Just 
Compensation Act of 1993, which would have required federal agencies 
to compensate private property owners for any diminution in value 
caused by a regulatory action taken under certain environmental laws, 
including the ESA.
305
 The bill remains unenacted, perhaps because, as 
former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt contends, “It is a 
pernicious way of saying we are going to destroy the efficacy of 
government.”
306
 Instead, Babbitt counters, use of the ESA is a valid 
exercise of sovereign power, similar to planning and zoning laws: 
“Regulatory action taken for a valid public purpose can have 
consequences that legally inconvenience people and, from time to time, 
do diminish someone’s rights.”
307
 Yet the ESA is not a land-use law; “It 
is a law which says we are going to protect public property—wild and 
endangered species—but it acknowledges that in many cases the only 
efficacious way to protect an endangered species is to protect habitat.”
308
 
By protecting habitat, the ESA inevitably impinges on some property 
interests, but are these protected interests that require compensation if 
taken? 
 Long before the ESA existed, federal and state courts answered that 
question in the negative. The public ownership doctrine was invoked to 
uphold state authority to regulate uses of private property without 
                                                 
304. Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation Within 
the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 357 (1994). 
305. Just Compensation Act of 1993, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. (1st. Sess. 1993). 
306. Babbitt, supra note 304, at 359. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 360. 
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requiring compensation for the protection or restoration of wildlife. In 
1884, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the concept to fish protection: 
The nature of fish impels them periodically to pass up and down 
streams for breeding purposes, and in such streams no one, not even 
the owner of the soil over which the stream runs, owns the fish 
therein, or has any legal right to obstruct their passage up or down, 
for to do so would be to appropriate what belongs to all to his own 
individual use, which would be contrary to the common right, and 
all having a common and equal ownership, nothing short of legisla-




 Therefore, the public ownership doctrine can lead to the state-
ordered destruction of private dams blocking fish migration.
310
 Courts 
have upheld a state’s power to do so. For example, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that it was not a taking to order the 
destruction of a private dam, noting that an implied limitation on a 
landowner’s operation of a dam is that “fish should not be interrupted in 
their passage up the river to cast their spawn . . . [and this] limitation 
must extend to give a right to the government to enter and remove 
obstructions, which, if not removed, would defeat the limitation.”
311
 The 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court reached a similar holding in rejecting a 
private dam owner’s challenge to the state’s right to enter his property 
and destroy his dam.
312
 State officials have the right to take such an 
action, because “the common law rights of the riparian proprietor . . . 
yielded to the paramount claims of the public.”
313
 These early cases 
establish public rights in wild animals, but they do not address the 
question of whether public ownership of wildlife bars Fifth Amendment 
taking claims that arise from application of the ESA. 
 The prelude to any Fifth Amendment taking analysis is whether the 
claimant possesses a protected property interest. Under Lucas, a taking 
claim is barred if the limitation “inheres in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State’s law or property and 
                                                 
309. Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 588–89 (1884); see also Commonwealth v. Essex Co., 79 
Mass. (13 Gray) 239, 249 (1859) (holding “the right of the public to the passage of fish in rivers, and 
the private rights of riparian proprietors, incident to and dependent on the public right, have been 
subject to the regulation of the legislature”); State v. Roberts, 59 N.H. 484, 486 (1879) (holding the 
state has the right “to regulate the destruction or preservation of fish, their free passage, and the use 
of the water as a highway,” even where such streams are nonnavigable and cross private land). 
310. John Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife 
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 347 (2003). 
311. Inhabitants of Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 522, 529 (1808). 
312. Cottrill v. Myrick, 12 Me. 222, 232–34 (1835). 
313. Id. at 229. 
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nuisance already place upon land ownership.”
314
 A strong argument can 
be made that public ownership of wildlife establishes a “preexisting” 
limitation on private title, thus limiting the landowner’s right to maintain 
a dam blocking migratory fish.
315
 Actions mandated by the ESA may 
also fall under the umbrella of background principles of nuisance law,
316
 
“nuisance” being defined as “an unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public.”
317
 Ownership rights in wildlife are 
common to all members of the public.
318
 The death of a wild animal—a 
threatened or endangered one, no less—can therefore be characterized as 
an “unreasonable interference” with public rights.
319
 Maintenance of a 
dam, or any other activity that invades public rights in wildlife, is a 
nuisance under Lucas and not a protected property right. 
 The public ownership argument has been used successfully to defeat 
Fifth Amendment taking claims based on laws protecting endangered 
species. In 2000, the New York Supreme Court relied on the argument 
and the ESA to reject a taking claim involving a property owner wishing 
to mine his property and the New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC), the state agency implementing the ESA.
320
 The 
plaintiff had begun the process of applying for a mining permit when the 
den of a timber rattlesnake, a threatened species under New York law, 
was discovered on an adjacent parcel.
321
 The den’s close proximity to 
plaintiff’s parcel meant that the snakes would use portions of plaintiff’s 
property as forage habitat.
322
 The plaintiff therefore constructed a fence 
to keep the snakes off his property.
323
 In response, the DEC filed suit 
seeking an injunction requiring the removal of the fence.
324
 The owner 
opposed, claiming that the injunction was a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.
325
 The court affirmed the grant of an injunction and rejected 
the taking claim, holding that 
the State, through the exercise of its police power, is safeguarding 
the welfare of an indigenous species that has been found to be 
                                                 
314. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
315. Echeverria et al., supra note 310, at 352–53. 
316. Id. 
317. Restatement (Second) of Torts §851B (1979). 
318. Echeverria, supra note 310, at 352. 
319. Id. (citing Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 588 (1884)) ("No one . . . owns the fish . . . or 
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320. See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
321. Id. at 80. 
322. Id. at 81. 
323. Id. at 80. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 82. 
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threatened with extinction. The State’s interest in protecting its wild 
animals is a venerable principle that can properly serve as a legiti-
mate basis for the exercise of its police power.
326
 
 California courts have similarly recognized the power of the public 
ownership doctrine to defeat a taking claim. The California District 
Court of Appeals concluded that the doctrine of public ownership 
supports rejecting a taking claim based on an endangered species 
regulation:
327
 “[W]ildlife regulation of some sort has been historically a 
part of the preexisting law of property.”
328
 This shows that the public 
ownership doctrine operates as a Lucas “background principle” of state 
law precluding takings liability.
329
 These later-ESA cases, and earlier 
pre-ESA cases involving dams obstructing fish passage,
330
 demonstrate 
that the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife can support the removal 
of private dams while shielding the government from Fifth Amendment 
taking claims. 
2. The Federal Government and Taking Claims from Water Users 
 As previously discussed, due to the discretionary rule,
331
 an 
agency’s obligation to perform a Section 7 consultation ultimately comes 
down to the existence of, or lack of, agency discretion.
332
 When an 
agency has discretion, it may seek a biological opinion (BiOp), pursuant 
to Section 7’s consultation requirement, to avoid Section 9 liability for 
taking a listed species. A BiOp ensures that the proposed federal action 
will not jeopardize the survival and recovery of a listed species. If the 
BiOp concludes that the proposed agency action is likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of a listed species, “reasonable and prudent 
alternatives” are recommended that will avoid jeopardy if 
implemented.
333
 The BiOp may recommend a reduction in water 
deliveries, and some water users may claim a taking of their water rights. 
 The Ninth Circuit has traditionally rejected those taking claims. For 
example, in O’Neill v. United States, water users moved to enforce a 
                                                 
326. Id. at 94. 
327. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 344–45 (Cal. Dist. 
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328. Id. at 347. 
329. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
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331. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2009). 
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judgment requiring the United States to perform its water service 
contract.
334
 The court held that a provision in the contract stating that the 
government would not be liable for damages arising from shortages in 
water supplied due to “errors in operation, drought, or any other cause[]” 
relieved the government from liability for not delivering water on 
account of valid legislation, even if that legislation was enacted 
subsequent to the contract.
335
  
 After O’Neill, the Ninth Circuit was again confronted with a 
conflict between federal water contracts and the ESA. In Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Houston,
336
 which involved pre-ESA water 
renewal contracts renegotiated after enactment of the ESA, the water 
users argued that the Bureau of Reclamation lacked “discretion to alter 
the terms of the renewal contracts, particularly the quantity of water 
delivered.”
337
 The court rejected this argument and refused to apply the 
discretionary rule that would have exempted compliance with the 
ESA.
338
 The Bureau of Reclamation had discretion when renegotiating 
renewal contracts to alter key terms and “may be able to reduce the 
amount of water available for sale if necessary to comply with ESA.”
339
  
 Following Houston, the case of Klamath Water Users Protective 
Ass’n v. Patterson was another victory for the ESA over a federal 
contract for water rights.
340
 In Klamath, petitioners sought enforcement 
of a water delivery contract negotiated in 1956, pre-dating the enactment 
of the ESA.
341
 Rejecting their argument, the court, based on the terms of 
the contract, held that the Bureau of Reclamation “retains overall 
authority over decision in use of Project waters,”
342
 which includes “the 
authority to direct Dam operations to comply with the ESA.”
343
 Within 
the Ninth Circuit, the federal government is free to modify water delivery 
contracts for the benefit of a listed species. 
 Although the Ninth Circuit has rejected Fifth Amendment taking 
claims from water rights users, the Court of Federal Claims has not. In 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, the Court of 
Federal Claims set a precedent by recognizing a per se physical taking. 
Monetary damages were awarded when, in order to retain some instream 
                                                 
334. O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1995). 
335. Id. at 686. 
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341. Id. at 1209–10. 
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343. Id. 
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flows for fish habitat to comply with the ESA, the Bureau of 
Reclamation did not deliver water to irrigators as required by state water 
delivery contracts.
344
 Instead of applying a regulatory takings analysis, 
the Tulare court found a per se taking by physical invasion of the 
plaintiff’s property rights.
345
 This unusual holding is limited by the 
unique facts of the case. The contracts at issue were with the State of 
California, not the federal government. The irrigators therefore did not 
have to surmount a common clause in Bureau of Reclamation contracts 
that excuses the federal government from liability for failure to deliver a 
full water supply.
346
 The water contract was also atypical in that it 
specified the volume of water to be delivered.
347
  
 After Tulare, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue in a 
case from the Klamath Project and reached the same conclusion on very 
different grounds. The court first held that the only available remedy to 
the irrigators would be a breach of contract claim, not a taking claim: 
“Like it or not, water rights, though undeniably precious, are subject to 
the same rules that govern all forms of property—they enjoy no elevated 
or more protected status. . . . [T]hose rights, such as they exist, take the 
form of contract claims and will be resolved as such.”
348
 The contract 
claims were later rejected because enactment of the ESA was a sovereign 
act that can give no rise to contractual liability for the government.
349
 
 The CFC thus favored enforcement of the ESA over federal 
contracts for water, but only for a limited time. Years later, in Casitas 
Municipal Water District v. United States, the same Court of Federal 
Claims judge would retreat from this physical takings approach, 
concluding that the intervening Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
350
 decision required a regulatory 
taking analysis for the reduction in water availability resulting from an 
ESA requirement that water be left instream.
351
 On appeal, the Federal 
                                                 
344. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246, 254 (Fed. Cl. 
2003). 
345. Id. 
346. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 321 (Fed. Cl. 2001). 
347. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 320–21 (distinguishing 
O’Neill). 
348. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 540 (Fed. Cl. 2005). 
349. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 685, 695 (Fed. Cl. 2007). 
350. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–24 
(2002) (holding that the question of whether the Takings Clause requires compensation when 
government enacts temporary regulation denying property owner all viable economic use of property 
is to be decided by applying factors of Penn Central, not by applying any categorical rule). 
351. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“[Tahoe-
Sierra] compels us to respect the distinction between a government takeover of property (either by 
physical invasion or by directing the property’s use to its own needs) and the government restraints 
on an owner’s use of that property.”). 
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Circuit reversed because it saw the ESA-compelled physical diversion of 
water as a physical taking of water rights—as opposed to a regulatory 
restriction on the amount available for use.
352
 In reaching this holding, 
the Federal Circuit decided a case that was different from that decided by 
the Court of Federal Claims.
353
 Contrary to the Court of Federal Claims’ 
view of the case, which focused on the water that was required to be left 
in the river, the Federal Circuit insisted that the crucial fact in its analysis 
was that the regulation did not merely require that water be left in the 
river, but instead required the plaintiff to direct water, once it was 
diverted out of the river and into the diversion canal, through the fish 
passage facility.
354
 In 2009, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its decision 
that a physical taking had occurred.
355
  
 There is “no support” whatsoever in precedent for the Casitas 
decision for evaluating regulations that require water to be left in a water 
body as potential per se takings.
356
 When the Supreme Court last 
addressed the issue over a century ago, it rejected the theory that a state 
legislative restriction on the export of water to neighboring states 
affected a taking of a riparian water right.
357
 A per se taking analysis is 
therefore incorrect, and a traditional Penn Central analysis should apply 
to regulations such as the ESA that limit water use. 
 Going forward, the Casitas decision should be read narrowly. It 
established a precedent applicable only in the particular situation where a 
water right holder is subject to an affirmative mandate to direct water 
through a fish ladder or some other type of off-river structure.
358
 The 
United States has several strong arguments against future taking claims 
that rely on Casitas. For example, even if a per se taking analysis 
continues to be applied to an ESA-mandated requirement to divert water 
through a fish ladder, the larger regulatory scheme in which the 
requirement is imposed indicates that the taking claim should be 
                                                 
352. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
353. See John Echeverria, Four Propositions About the Casitas Litigation (Nov. 6–7, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/2009TakingsConfer
ence/EcheverriaConferencePaper.pdf. 
354. Id. 
355. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 556 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
356. Echeverria, supra note 353. 
357. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
358. Echeverria, supra note 353, at 6. 
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evaluated as an exaction under Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n
359
 
and Dolan v. City of Tigard.
360
  
 The third form of a Fifth Amendment taking, an exaction—a 
regulatory/physical taking hybrid
361
—arises where a government agency 
grants a property owner permission to exploit a property interest, subject 
to a condition that would normally be independently viewed as a per se 
taking.
362
 The ESA-mandated diversion in Casitas should have been 
viewed as an exaction because the requirement was imposed as a 
condition attached to a BiOp which grants regulatory permission for 
operation of the dam.
363
 The taking test for an exaction has two prongs, 
known as “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality.”
364
 Failure to 
satisfy either prong of the test is a taking. The essential nexus prong 
requires that “an exaction condition . . . must substantially advance a 
government purpose that would justify denial of the permit.”
365
 The 
second prong, rough proportionality, requires “the burden imposed on 
the property owner by the exaction must be no greater than ‘roughly 
proportional’ to the impact of the proposed development on the 
community.”
366
 Application of the essential nexus and rough 
proportionality prongs of the exaction test should yield a conclusion that 
the regulation did not result in a taking.
367
 The requirement to divert 
water through the fish way for the protection of the fishery is logically 
related to—shares an essential nexus with—the government’s regulatory 
purpose of reviewing dam operations. The modest amount of water 
diverted is more than roughly proportional to the harms caused by the 
dam operations that the government is attempting to redress. 
 In conclusion, there are defenses to counter any Fifth Amendment 
taking claim where the ESA alters dam operations or reduces a water 
delivery. The public trust doctrine, in those states in which it is subsumed 
in the water rights system, provides an additional argument against future 
                                                 
359. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (requiring an “essential nexus” 
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361. MELTZ, supra note 202, at 38. 
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365. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
366. ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA) AND 
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374, 391 (1994). 
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taking claims that rely on Casitas. Where the claimant cannot point to a 
protected property interest that has been “taken” by the challenged 
regulation, the taking claim cannot succeed. The public trust doctrine 
prohibits a water right holder from claiming a property entitlement to 
exploit water in a way that is harmful to public trust resources—in this 
case wild and endangered species.
368
 Finally, the doctrine of public 
ownership of wildlife and Lucas background principles of state nuisance 
law enable the removal of private dams while shielding the government 
from Fifth Amendment taking claims. 
V. TAKING CLAIMS FROM RIPARIAN PROPERTY OWNERS 
 Owners of property riparian to waters affected by dam removal may 
demand compensation.
369
 Upstream of the dam, the reservoir can 
diminish substantially or disappear following dam removal, exposing 
previously submerged lands. When this happens, depending upon who 
owns title to the newly surfaced lands, riparian landowners may find 
themselves severed from contact with the water and assert a loss of 
associated riparian rights. In Wisconsin, for example, a dam owner’s 
decision to remove a dam resulted in the filing of a civil suit by the dam 
owner’s neighbors.
370
 The suit alleged that removal of the dam reduced 
residential real estate values and altered the quality of their lives and the 
enjoyment of their property.
371
 Downstream, the effects of removing the 
dam are reversed. Rivers may swell after a dam is removed, causing 
property damage above the high-water mark. Although the previously 
discussed federal navigation servitude generally exempts the government 
from paying compensation in situations where navigable waters are 
involved, a more precise analysis of the servitude’s powers and 
jurisdiction is necessary to determine the extent of any potential Fifth 
Amendment taking liability. 
A. Riparian Rights and Artificial Watercourses 
 Determining the legal effects upstream of dam removal involves 
two separate but related issues: (1) whether the ordinary rules of riparian 
rights apply to artificially created water bodies, and (2) who holds title to 
the previously submerged lands.  
                                                 
368. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (holding the 
public trust doctrine “prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a 
manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust.”). 
369. Smith, supra note 150. 
370. Id. 
371. Id. 
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 Riparian rights attach to riparian land, those tracts of land that are 
contiguous with the water’s edge.
372
 A riparian landowner does not own 
any portion of the waterbody, but instead owns numerous rights in it 
known as usufructuary rights.
373
 These rights include the following: the 
right to the flow of the stream, the right to make a reasonable use of the 
waterbody, the right of access to the waterbody, the right to fish, the right 
to wharf out, the right to prevent erosion of the banks, the right to purity 




 The Restatement of Torts defines “artificial watercourses” as 
“waterways that owe their origin to acts of man, such as canals, drainage 
and irrigation ditches, aqueducts, flumes, and the like.”
375
 Black’s Law 
Dictionary similarly defines “artificial watercourse” as “a man-made 
watercourse.”
376
 One example of an artificial waterbody is a lake formed 
by a dam and reservoir system that enlarges the water surface of a 
preexisting river or stream. These can range in size from small, New 
England millponds to the enormous Hoover Dam and Lake Mead. 
 Conventional wisdom holds that the normal rules of riparian rights 
do not attach to artificial watercourses because the expectations of those 
owners abutting artificial watercourses are not the same as those of 
riparians along a natural watercourse.
377
 The “artificial” riparian has no 
common law right to the maintenance of the artificial watercourse and 
cannot compel the maintenance of the water at any particular level.
378
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App. 1999) (explaining doctrine of riparian rights “is simply inapplicable” in situations where 
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on other grounds, 272 Ga. 118 (2000); Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 481 (Mich. 1967) 
(finding riparian rights of access to a lake do not attach to land connected by an artificial canal); 
Crenshaw v. Graybeal, 597 So. 2d 650, 652 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 
502 (Miss. 1990)) (stating titleholders of artificial lakes exclusively own the waters “whether the 
lake or pond has been built for commercial, drainage, recreation or aesthetic reasons”). 
378. See Wood v. S. River Drainage Dist., 422 S.W.2d 33, 38–39 (Mo. 1967) (denying relief to 
a resort owner who was located on a bay of the Mississippi River that was dammed as part of a 
drainage project when the bay was subsequently lowered for drainage reasons). 
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More specifically, riparian rights only attach to the “normal flow” of 
waters, as opposed to “floodwaters,” into which category a dam’s large 
reservoir could be placed.
379
 At least one court has adopted this view in 




 What if an artificial watercourse becomes “natural”? Given enough 
time, an artificial watercourse such as a reservoir may “take on the 
characteristics of a natural watercourse and come to be regarded . . . as 
such.”
381
 In order to determine whether an artificial watercourse has 
become “natural,” courts look to three criteria: “(1) whether the 
[watercourse] is temporary or permanent,[
382
] (2) the circumstances 
under which it was created,[
383
] and (3) the mode in which it has been 
used or enjoyed.”
384
 The main question underlying the three criteria is 
“whether surrounding landowners have come to treat the [watercourse] 
as a natural part of the landscape and adjusted their behavior and 
expectations accordingly.”
385
 “The longer an artificial watercourse is 
maintained at a constant level, the stronger the expectations are of 
shoreland owners that riparian rights will be recognized.”
386
  
 Prescription can be a basis for attaching riparian rights to artificial 
waters.
387
 “Prescriptive rights [are] frequently . . . claimed [in lakes] 
maintained at [artificially] high levels for [a] long period[] of time. 
[Some riparian] owners whose lands have been subject to prescriptive 
easements have asserted a reciprocal negative easement to prevent the 
lake from being lowered.”
388
  
 Courts have found ways to protect the expectations of these riparian 
owners. Removal of a milldam was enjoined because the construction of 
cabins along the shore of the artificial lake and their maintenance for the 
prescriptive period gave the owners a reciprocal right to compel 
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387. Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 848 A.2d 474, 481 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding a 
50-year old pond created by dam had become a natural water body), rev'd, 273 Conn. 217 (2005). 
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maintenance of the dam.
389
 The dam, a “permanent obstruction” having 
been maintained for a great length of time, transformed the “artificial 
conditions created thereby . . . [to] natural conditions.”
 390
 The court 
observed, “even nature herself became adapted to the new 
surrounding.”
391
 A native growth of hardwood timber had sprung up, 




 Prescriptive rights could also apply to those who depend on dams to 
keep their property dry. A landowner who mined and processed brines 
from a lakebed exposed by water diversions recovered damages when the 
lake flooded and inundated his plant because substantial expenditures 
had been made in reliance on the continued diversions.
393
 Prescriptive 
rights have been asserted on the theory that a dam owner effectively 




 Where a court refuses to recognize prescriptive rights in artificial 
lake levels, the following reasoning of the Nebraska Supreme Court is 
typical: 
Construction and maintenance of a dam over a long period of time 
may well tend to lead persons owning property above the dam to 
believe that a permanent and valuable right has been acquired, or is 
naturally present. The very fact that a man-made dam is obviously 
present, however, is sufficient to charge them with notice that the 
water level is artificial as distinguished from natural, and that its 
level may be lowered or returned to the natural state at any time. . . . 
We hold that where a dam has been built for the private conven-
ience and advantage of the owner, he is not required to maintain and 
operate it for the benefit of an upper riparian owner who obtains ad-
vantages from its existence; and that the construction and mainte-
nance of such a dam does not create any reciprocal rights in up-




                                                 
389. Brown v. Tomlinson, 272 S.E.2d 258, 259–60 (Ga. 1980) (holding appellant has a 
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 Landowners thus face the challenge of proving riparian rights attach 
to their property—either because the watercourse is natural or should be 
considered natural. Even if riparian rights are recognized, the Supreme 
Court held in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment that 
riparian rights do not include an independent right of contact with the 
water under Florida law.
396
 Instead, the right to contact with the water is 
a component of the riparian right of access to the water, and exists only 
to preserve the core riparian right of access.
397
 Therefore, so long as 
access to the water is maintained, possibly through a public easement, a 
landowner’s loss of contact with the water following dam removal may 
not be a compensable claim. 
B. Before Dam Removal: Title to Submerged Lands 
 If an artificial riparian right is recognized as a compensable 
property right for purposes of a Fifth Amendment taking, the next 
question to ask is whether the right is lost. More specifically, is the 
riparian right lost because title to the newly exposed lands rests with 
someone other than the previously riparian landowner? Under the 
doctrine of navigability for title, each state owns the lands beneath its 
rivers and lakes that are navigable at the time of statehood.
398
 Whether a 
river is navigable is a federal question to be determined by the 
navigability-in-fact test as stated in The Daniel Ball.
399
 A river is 
navigable in fact when, in its ordinary state, it is used as, or capable of 
use as, a “highway[] for commerce, over which trade and travel are or 
may be conducted.”
400
 A state holds title to land under navigable-in-fact 
waters in trust to secure public use so that the people “may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty 




 To facilitate the building of dams, federal statutes empower a 
licensee to condemn or otherwise pay for the land to be flooded.
402
 After 
the impoundment submerges new lands, title to the original riverbed of a 
navigable river remains with the state after the water’s artificial 
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expansion.
403
 Defining the extent of the state’s ownership, however, 
requires identifying submerged boundaries—no easy task. In order to 
answer the question of who holds title to these lands when they 
resurface, it must be determined who holds title to them after they are 
submerged. Title to the lands artificially flooded under the Federal Power 
Act and other federal legislation could be owned by the state, the 
condemner, or the abutting riparian owners. 
 The issue is further complicated by the additional question of which 
law to apply: federal or state. Federal courts ordinarily defer to state law 
to define property rights below the high-water mark.
404
 “In the case of 
artificial reservoirs, however, it is unclear whether federal courts will 
apply [state or federal law].”
405
 An exception to the rule of federal 
deference to state water law occurs in conflicts involving the federal 
navigation servitude.
406
 Another occurs “where [riparian] title rests with 
or was derived from the Federal Government,” in which case federal law 
governs.
407
 Hydropower project licensees, preferring the application of 
federal law, sometimes rely upon this last exception, but artificial 
reservoirs are not typically created on federal land.
408
 Instead, a federal 
licensee’s title is generally derived from condemnation privileges; title to 
the land comes from state or private owners.
409
 Hence, the creation of an 
artificial reservoir on state or private land will “not present a situation 
where the United States Government has never parted with title and its 
interest in the property continues.”
410
 Even where federal land is flooded, 
the argument can be made that use of the Federal Power Act or the 
Reclamation Act “to displace state riparian ownership laws would 
deprive the states of a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty—title 
and control over submerged lands.”
411
 In practice, federal courts will 
probably subject state claims to both federal and state law.
412
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 Both recent and historic state cases show that title to private lands 
flooded by the construction of a federal dam transfers to the state. The 
California Supreme Court has held that the state’s waterline statutes 
constitute an affirmative “conveyance,” granting all land above the low-
water mark to adjoining landowners.
413
 By necessity, this conveys to the 
state “a ‘claim’ to all flooded lands below the low-water mark.”
414
 
Finding otherwise would inhibit the state’s public trust responsibilities.
415
 
Perhaps most significantly, these rights were defined using the current 
water levels artificially raised by dams.
416
 
 In another case, the California Supreme Court based its decision on 
the physical difficulty of reconstructing the original water levels, noting 
the “monumental evidentiary problem” that would be created.
417
 
Principles of prescription and adverse possession also supported a 
transfer of title to the state.
418
 Furthermore, the artificial conditions 
created by the dam had become natural, placing “title to the lands 
covered by the waters of the lake [in] the same trust as that of lands 
covered by the waters of natural navigable lakes.”
419
 
 The theory that a dam builder dedicates his submerged waters to the 
state was adopted as early as 1899 in Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy: 
When the owner of the land raised the lake level so as to cover it, 
such land immediately became subject to use by the public as a part 
of the natural lake bed, not by permission of the owner of the paper 
title, but by the same right that the public used any other part of the 
lake . . . . [This] brings into play the principle of estopped in paid, 
which precludes him from revoking what is legally considered a 
dedication of his land affected by his acts, to the public use.
420
 
 Thus, when a navigable river is artificially expanded, title to the 
submerged lands—state or private—passes to the state. But the question 
still remains: Does title to these submerged lands remain with the state 
after they reemerge? 
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2012] Let the River Run 53 
C. After Dam Removal: Title to Reemerged Lands 
 The Supreme Court of Maine held title to the exposed lands does 
not transfer to the previously riparian owner: “When the waters of these 
Ponds were drained, it exposed the bed of the Ponds below low-water 
mark, but that did not transfer title to the exposed bed to the littoral 
proprietor.”
421
 In Florida, the common law doctrine of reliction, defined 
as “an increase of the land by a gradual and imperceptible withdrawal of 
any body of water,” vests title to the new land with the riparian owner.
422
 
The doctrine was held inapplicable, however, in a state lake-lowering 
project that exposed shore land because, among other reasons, the water 
did not recede “by imperceptible degrees.”
423
 Florida courts also 
recognize the common law rule of avulsion. Avulsion is “the sudden or 
perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water or a 
sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of a stream.”
424
 If an 
avulsive event has occurred, “the boundary between public and private 
land remains the [mean high water line] as it existed before the avulsive 
event led to sudden and perceptible . . . additions to the shoreline.”
425
 
Thus, title to newly exposed lands following dam removal does not 
transfer away from the state to the previously riparian owner. 
D. A Taking Analysis of “Artificial” Riparian Rights 
 If the state’s continued interest in the reemerged land survives dam 
removal, some previously riparian owners may claim a loss of riparian 
rights where their property no longer touches the water. Stop the Beach 
Renourishment cautioned that Florida law does not recognize an 
independent riparian right of contact with the water, and loss of that 
contact with the water is not a compensable taking so long as the riparian 
right of access to the water is preserved.
426
 Assuming, arguendo, that the 
affected riparian is in a state that recognizes an independent riparian right 
of contact with the water as a protected property interest, which taking 
analysis applies? If the parcel as a whole rule
427
 is applied, the 
elimination of one stick from the bundle of property rights, in this case 
the “stick” that represents riparian rights, is not a taking when the parcel 
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is considered as a whole.
428
 While the “fronting of a lot upon a navigable 
stream or bay often constitutes its chief value and desirability,”
429
 the 
property retains the ability to be developed in an economically viable 
way after it loses contact with the water.
430
 Moreover, the issue is moot if 
courts refuse to recognize an “artificial” riparian interest in the first 
place. 
E. Flooding and Property Damage Occurring Above the High Water 
Mark 
 The flooding of downstream lands following dam removal presents 
another potential source of liability. The federal navigation servitude’s 
protection from Fifth Amendment taking claims is limited to lands below 
the high water mark.
431
 When a dam is constructed to improve 
navigability, the government must pay for the land it floods. In the 
seminal case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff was owed compensation for the 640 acres of his land that 
were flooded: “Where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced 
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any 
artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its 
usefulness, it is a taking within the meaning of the Constitution.”
432
 Thus 
when the government, through its creation of artificial structures, floods 
land where no such condition previously existed, a physical taking will 
be recognized by courts. 
 Where, however, intermittent flooding naturally occurred prior to 
the installation of an artificial structure, courts are less likely to find a 
physical taking.
433
 For example, in Leeth v. United States, the Court of 
Federal Claims rejected a taking claim where the property had been 
                                                 
428. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327 
(2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978)) (explaining 
the parcel as a whole rule for Penn Central’s regulatory taking analysis). 
429. Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 507 (Fla. 1918). 
430. See John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1535, 1557–62 (1994) (explaining that the takings inquiry should be whether the acreage 
whose inclusion is in question, presumably the nonriparian portions, could be independently 
developed in an economically viable way). 
431. United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 804–05 (1950) (holding the United 
States liable for the destruction of the agricultural value of the land above the ordinary high water 
mark of the river). 
432. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871); see also United States v. Lynah, 
188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) (“[W]here the government by the construction of a dam or other public 
works so floods lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a 
taking within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
433. Sharon S. Tisher, Everglades Restoration: a Constitutional Takings Analysis, 10 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1994). 
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particularly susceptible to flooding prior to construction of the dam.
434
 
The court adopted this reasoning again in Laughlin v. United States 
holding no taking occurred when a marsh was created by a flood control 
project because the land was subject to the risk of periodic overflows by 
floodwater.
435
 Can this be applied to situations where land floods 
downstream after the government removes a dam for purposes of 
navigation? 
 Courts should treat the downstream flooding that results from dam 
removal as a noncompensable injury rather than a per se physical taking. 
Dams provide flood control. Any riparian land that floods after a dam is 
removed was inherently vulnerable to flooding before the dam was 
constructed. Leeth and Laughlin counsel against the validity of any such 
taking claim. 
 Recently, landowners along the original—now dewatered—riverbed 
of the San Joaquin River filed a taking claim against the United States in 
response to the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement’s plan to 
restore water flows for endangered salmon.
436
 The plaintiffs allege that 
the restoration will result in a taking of both their land and water 
rights.
437
 Approximately sixty to one hundred miles of the old riverbed of 
the San Joaquin River have lain continuously dry, except during rare 
flood events, since the Friant Dam and its related irrigation channels 
were completed nearly sixty years ago.
438
 In order to reintroduce salmon 
to the river, channel improvements will be made to the old riverbed and 
water will be procured from current users for release from the Friant 
Dam so that a continuous flow of water can be achieved down the river’s 
length at a level sufficient to support salmon.
439
 The riverbed currently 
has a zero-flow capacity; it has been flattened and farmed by plaintiffs.
440
 
The Bureau of Reclamation may therefore excavate portions of 
plaintiff’s soil to a depth of between four to nine feet, and remove a 
width of 300 to 1,000 feet, for a length of twenty to thirty miles.
441
 Head 
gate and slough control structures may be erected on and with access 
through the plaintiff’s property.
442
 An additional claim—similar to that in 
                                                 
434. Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467 (1991). 
435. See Laughlin v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 85, 102 (1990) (refusing to hold the Bureau of 
Reclamation liable for flooding as a result of “whatever climactic conditions nature chooses to 
deliver.”). 
436. Complaint, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co., v. United States, No. 10-580 L (Fed. Cl. Aug. 26, 
2010). 
437. Id. at 15. 
438. Id. at 9. 
439. Id. at 13. 
440. Id. at 17. 
441. Id. at 18. 
442. Id. 
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Kansas City
443
—asserts that restoration of the river will result in seepage 
and raising of underground water and salt levels so as to destroy the 
land’s agricultural and cattle grazing potential.
444
 The plaintiff speculates 
that “non-farmable ‘forested/wooded plains’ ” will be created for up to 
one mile on either side of the river, thereby destroying “thousands of 
acres” of farmland.
445
 The final complaint concerns a public easement, 
required by California law, which must be placed on the land to provide 
ingress and egress for public fishing and recreation activities on the 
river.
446
 This case could have answered many of the important questions 
raised by this article, but on December 9, 2010, the parties to the case 




VI. SEDIMENT: AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF LIABILITY FOLLOWING 
DAM REMOVAL 
 One final source of liability exists for dam owners following dam 
removal. All dams “create reservoirs behind the impoundment that will 
eventually fill with sediment.”
448
 There is currently no best management 
practice for sediment.
449
 Some dam owners manage the accumulated 
sediment by dredging and removing it before dam removal. If dredging is 
not performed, the impoundment is either drained through the gates of 
the dam or, with a nongated dam, notching is performed to breach 
segments of the dam.
450
  
 Erosion, flooding, and the release of potentially toxic sediment may 
occur as a result. “[S]ediment may contain contaminants ranging from 
agricultural pesticides to industrial waste and heavy metals.”
451
 The river 
                                                 
443. United States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). In Kansas City, the plaintiff 
demanded compensation for the agricultural value of a portion of his land that was now unsuitable 
for farming after construction of a dam raised the water table so that the land would not drain 
adequately. Id. at 801–04. 
444. See Complaint, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co., supra note 436, at 19. 
445. Id. at 20. 
446. Id. at 22–23. 
447. As of May 24, 2011, the parties are in the dispute resolution process. See Denial of 
Motion to Intervene, Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, No. 10-580 L (Fed. Cl. May 24, 
2011), available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/HEWITT.WOLFSEN052411.p
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448. Catherine C. Engberg, The Dam Owner’s Guide to Retirement Planning: Assessing 
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available at http://www.wisconsinrivers.org/documents/dams/Dam%20Removal%20-
%20A%20Citizens%20Guide%20to%20Saving%20Rivers.pdf. 
450. Engberg, supra note 448. 
451. Id. at 180. 
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itself will physically change as the sediment deposits in downstream 
channels, making them shallower and wider.
452
 “As a result, 
[downstream] riparian land becomes more susceptible to increased 
erosion and property damage,” including flooding.
453
 These effects are 
greatest when a dam is removed without first dredging the impounded 
sediment. 
 The tort law of trespass may hold dam owners liable for the release 
of this sediment. A trespass action is conceptually appropriate because it 
requires showing only that the dam’s accumulated sediment was a 
physical entry onto land.
454
 Unfortunately, this has the effect of creating 
a disincentive for the voluntary removal of dams for fear of liability to 
downstream landowners. Traditional tort and property law principles 
afford a dam owner relatively few defenses.
455
 To remedy this and create 
incentives for the removal of obsolete dams, courts can recognize the 
defenses of modern comparative negligence and public policy for the 
benefit of public safety and environmental restoration.
456
  
 Additionally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
457
 empowers the EPA to 
order responsible parties to remove toxins from sediment before dam 
removal. In 1973, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation petitioned FERC 
to remove the Fort Edward Dam on the Hudson River because repair of 
the dam structure would be economically infeasible.
458
 The Commission 
granted the petition but required Niagara Mohawk to remove the 
sediment behind the impoundment.
459
 Despite the efforts of the 
Commission to minimize the adverse effects, nearly 200 miles of the 
Hudson River were contaminated and the area was declared a Superfund 
site.
460
 General Electric had discharged approximately 1.1 million pounds 
of PCBs into the Hudson River from two upstream plants.
461
 As this 
example illustrates, liability for toxic sediments ultimately rests with 
their creator, which may or may not be the dam owner. This eliminates 
one major potential source of liability for voluntary dam removal where 
the dam owner played no role in the creation of the toxic sediment 
behind the impoundment. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 As the preceding analysis shows, viable legal tools exist for 
removing obsolete dams whose existence no longer benefits the public. 
The ESA may be less effective than its drafters intended, but it remains a 
compelling reason for voluntary dam removal and has been successful in 
changing the way dams operate for the benefit of threatened species. 
Meanwhile, federal and state dam safety proceedings are also spurring 
voluntary dam removals, and likely offer the easiest route toward dam 
removal. Removal of unsafe dams benefits both people and the 
environment, and, as the majority of America’s dams are nearing the end 
of their structural lifespan, removal is often more practical than repair. 
Finally, the government itself has now recognized the value of a free-
flowing river over electric power generation and private profit. The 
FERC’s Edwards Dam decommission order marked a historic shift in the 
way the federal government looks at dams. 
 These legal options can be exercised without fear of Fifth 
Amendment taking liability. When FERC denies renewal of a 
hydropower license, licensees are not entitled to compensation. A license 
is a privilege, not a right, and a project owner enjoys no guarantee of 
license renewal as a property interest. For ESA-mandated dam removal, 
the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife and Lucas background 
principles of state nuisance law defeat most taking claims. Reducing 
water rights for the benefit of a listed species remains a tumultuous topic, 
but current Fifth Amendment taking law favors no taking. Compensation 
claims by parties other than dam owners affected by dam removal should 
similarly fail. Upstream of removal, courts should treat the water body as 
an artificial one to which no riparian rights attach. If a court instead treats 
the reservoir as a natural water body to which riparian rights would 
normally attach, the core riparian right of access to the water can be 
easily preserved through the use of an easement. Downstream of 
removal, taking claims from flooding should not be recognized as the 
landowner’s parcel was susceptible to flooding before the construction of 
the dam, and would be flooded in the water’s natural, unobstructed state. 
Finally, while sediment liability is a concern for many dam owners, 
CERCLA will rest liability for toxic sediment with its creator, and courts 
should consider comparative negligence and the benefit inured to the 
public by dam removal when hearing tort actions for trespass. 
 Dam removal is a site-specific process and is not always appropriate 
for legal, political, and even ecological reasons. However, where the 
public interest favors it, dam removal can be accomplished using 
strategies that defeat or minimize taking claims and other bases for 
liability. Dangerous and dated dams must not obstruct the restoration of 
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America’s treasured waters and doom our nation’s most celebrated 
fishes. 
